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The Acceptable Solutions C/AS1 to the New Zealand Building Code impose a limit of 
50 people that may be served by a single escape route. Restrictions are also placed on 
the travel distance between the most distant occupied space and the distance to reach 
the nearest safe path, safe place, or another firecell. These restrictions are related to 
the nature of the occupancy of the firecell, and the detection systems installed. 
This report compares the requirements of the New Zealand Acceptable Solutions with 
other equivalent documents from the United Kingdom and the United States of 
America, and assess the escape times associated with the requirements. It then 
reviews the detection, pre-movement, tenability, and available escape times from 
various standard t² and item fires in a variety of firecell sizes, for a variety of 
occupancies, and quantifies the probability of successful egress from an open plan 
firecell with a single means of escape. 
It is shown that if an adequate egress width is provided, the number of occupants in 
the room need not influence the time required to egress, but that the minimum door 
widths required by most approved documents will result in some queuing. Therefore, 
the limit of 50 people does not appear to result from a fire safety consideration, 
provided adequate egress widths are provided. 
It is concluded that the risk of obstruction by the fire is generally small, with the most 
likely cause of failure being from loss of tenability in the firecell. The greatest chance 
of successful egress is from a large firecell, there being few successful outcomes from 
small firecells. 
The provision of sprinklers has little effect on the tenability time in the firecell. There 
is some improvement in larger firecells, but not in those with smaller floor areas. The 
main benefit is in the control of the fire size, reducing the radiation levels and hence 
the risk of the fire obstructing the egress route. 





typically low, although this result is only valid where there are multiple routes within 
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DEOP  Dead End Open Path 
TOP  Total Open Path 
CL  Crowd, Large (>100 people) 
CM  Crowd, Mercantile 
CO  Crowd, Outside (external environment) 
CS  Crowd, Small (<100 people) 
SA  Sleeping, Hotel or transient accommodation 
SC Sleeping, in Care, such as a hospital, where occupants have reduced 
ability to care for themselves 
SD  Sleeping, Detained, such as a prison 
SR Sleeping, Residential, being long term accommodation, either rented or 
owner occupied 
WL  Working, Light Hazard 
WM  Working, Medium Hazard 
WH  Working, High Hazard 
WF  Working, Ultra fast fire growth rate 
NZBC  New Zealand Building Code 






Where appropriate, these definitions have been taken from the Acceptable Solutions 
C/AS1 to the New Zealand Building Code. 
Dead End: That part of an open path where escape is possible in only one direction. 
Horizontal Safe Path: A corridor which is a safe path 
Occupancy: The purpose and population of the space. In the New Zealand Acceptable 
Solutions C/AS1 this is equivalent to the purpose group. The type of occupancy 
reflects the familiarity and alertness of the occupants, and the fire hazard associated 
with the purpose for which the space is used. 
Open Path: That part of an escape route (including dead ends) within a firecell where 
occupants may be exposed to fire or smoke while making their escape. 
Pre-movement time: The time after detection of the fire before movement related to 
evacuation starts. Actions by occupants during this time may include (but are not 
limited to) movement relating to collecting belongings, notifying others, and fire 
fighting behaviour. 
Safe Path (also referred to in other codes as a Protected Path):That part of an exitway 
which is protected from the effects of fire by fire separations, external walls, or by 
distance when exposed to open air. 
Safe Place: A place of safety in the vicinity of a building, from which people may 
safely disperse after escaping the effects of a fire. It may be a place such as a street, 
open space, public space or an adjacent building. 






a A constant relating to the calculation of egress capacity, refer Equation 3.14 
Af  Floor area of firecell, m² 
BL Boundary Layer thickness, mm or m 
cp Specific heat  for air this is 1.040 kJ/kg.K 
cs Specific heat of skin, J/kg.K 
D Occupant density in escape routes, persons/m² 
Fsm Maximum specific flow in egress route, persons/s/m 
g Acceleration due to gravity, 9.81 m/s² 
H Height to the detector and/or ceiling, m 
k A constant relating to egress capacity, refer Equation 3.14 
ks Thermal conductivity of skin, W/m.K refer Table 3.1 
pm&  Mass flow of smoke in plume, kg/s 
P Number of people in firecell 
PS=1m Probability the separation distance between the fire and the egress route is 1 m 
or less 
PS=1-2m Probability the separation distance between the fire and the egress route is 
between 1 and 2 m 
PS=2-3m Probability the separation distance between the fire and the egress route is 





PS>3m Probability the separation distance between the fire and the egress route is 3 m 
or more 
"
rq&  Incident radiation, kW/m² 
Q& Heat release rate of the fire, kW 
*Q&  Normalised heat release rate of fire, see Equation 3.3 
RTI Response time index, (m/s)½ 
r Radial distance of a detector from the fire plume, m 
S Travel speed, m/s 
S Separation distance between the fire and the escape route, m 
S.F Safety Factor 
t Time, s 
tlag,plume Time for hot gases to rise in plume, s 
tlag,jet Time for hot gases to travel to detector in ceiling jet, s 
tp  Time for occupants to pass through the door, s 
tpre Pre-movement time, s 
tsp Time for pain to be felt due to skin temperature, s 
tt Travel time, s 
TD Temperature of detector, K 





pT  Average temperature of air in plume (K) 
Ts Temperature of skin, K 
T∞ Ambient temperature, K 
T∞s Ambient temperature of skin, K, usually taken as 32.5 ºC 
∆TD Change in detector temperature, K 
vjet Velocity of hot gases in the ceiling jet, m/s 
W Width of escape route, mm 
We Effective width of escape route, mm 
Weff Combination of factors affecting pre-movement time, refer Table 3.6 
x Travel distance, m 
xs Basal layer depth in skin where pain is felt, 0.00008 m 
x Minimum separation distance of egress route to fire, m 
z Height above fire at which mass flow and temperature are determined, at the 
base of the hot layer (m) 
αs  Thermal diffusivity of skin, m²/s 
λr  Radiative proportion of energy emitted  
ρ∞ Density of ambient air, 1.1 kg/m³ 
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The purpose of this study is to investigate the risk levels associated with single escape 
routes, review the acceptable, approved, and codified solutions documented in various 
national codes, and develop an alternative or specific design method for situations 
where the code based solutions appear to be inappropriate.  
Statistics provided by the New Zealand Fire Service will be used to illustrate the 
actual risk level in existing New Zealand Buildings, and serve as a baseline for the 
risk analysis of the Acceptable Solutions to the New Zealand Building Code. 
1.1 Escape from the Firecell of Fire Origin 
As noted above, it is intended to investigate the risks to occupants in the firecell of 
fire origin where only a single escape route is provided. The New Zealand Acceptable 
Solutions C/AS1 to the Building Code permit up to 50 people to be served by a single 
horizontal escape route, and depending on the detection and/or suppression systems 
installed, the maximum dead end open path travel distance can vary from as little as 
18 m to as much as 72 m. Where there is a choice of direction to different escape 
routes, longer travel distances are permitted. 
The primary hazards for occupants in the same space are smoke and heat. Heat is 
usually fairly localised to radiation from the fire itself, although radiation from the hot 
smoke may also affect tenability. Where there is a single escape route from a space, 
the primary concern is whether the fire is too close to the escape route, and may 
prevent use of the route. Therefore the radiation from a fire near an escape route and 
the level of damage or pain caused by this radiation to the people using the escape 
route is to be assessed. This assessment is also to be combined with an assessment of 
the probability that the fire is in such a position where it may obstruct the egress route. 
Therefore the first step is to assess the size of fire that can be safely passed without 





(and hence the time that the person is exposed to the radiation) is also identified as a 
factor to be considered. 
The other hazard for occupants in the firecell of fire origin is smoke. This is treated as 
a mixture of gases at a raised temperature. It usually includes oxygen, nitrogen, 
carbon dioxide, carbon monoxide, and soot as well as additional compounds related to 
the composition of the fuel. This hot layer tends to be hazardous to health when 
ingested if these constituents are present in sufficiently reduced (eg oxygen) or raised 
(CO2, CO) quantities. Some may be more directly poisonous. The temperature of the 
layer can also cause damage to the lungs if too hot when inhaled. For the above 
reasons, the tenability of the space is assumed to be maintained only when the hot 
layer is above head height. A 2 m clearance from floor level is usually required, and is 
used in this analysis, to ensure that even tall occupants are considered and to ensure 
that the smoke is not being inhaled by any occupants. 
To assess the tenability of the space, the level of the hot layer will be calculated from 
the volume of smoke flow in the plume, and it will be assumed to be evenly 
distributed throughout the ceiling space. 
Finally, it is necessary to identify the time at which the fire is discovered, whether by 
a detection system or the occupants themselves, assess how much time might pass 
between detection and the decision to evacuate, and calculate how long is available 
for evacuation. 
The above times can be difficult to determine with any degree of certainty. The 
detection time will vary depending on the size of the fire, the properties of the 
detector, and the location of the detector with respect to the fire. The greatest variation 
is when no automatic detectors are provided, and discovery of the fire is dependent on 
the occupants. 
The time required by the occupants to decide to evacuate is also difficult to determine, 





perception of the severity of the fire, and their commitment to their current activity. 
The time available to escape is then the time remaining after the decision to evacuate, 
and before the conditions become untenable or the fire prevents use of the escape 
route. This time is expected to have a wide distribution, but which may be related to 
certain controllable conditions on which a specific design might be based. 
1.2 @RISK 
In this study, the primary tool in assessing the risks and their relative importance is a 
software package called @RISK, from Palisade (2003). It is an add-on to Microsoft 
EXCEL, so all the calculations are carried out in a spreadsheet environment, as well 
as permitting further manipulation of the results in Microsoft EXCEL. 
Typically, spreadsheet analyses take a single set of input data, to provide a single set 
of results. @RISK expands this environment to allow a range of input data to be used, 
with a corresponding range of results. The input data, where there is some possible 
variation in the value (due to physical limitations, or possibly due to the requirement 
to consider a range of possibilities), may be assigned a distribution shape. For 
example, a normal bell curve distribution may be assigned to a detector parameter 
such as its RTI, and given a mean and standard deviation. The values of the RTI when 
taken over the whole number of repetitions of the analysis can then be seen to have 
this distribution. Each value is determined using the Monte Carlo technique. In this 
study, each analysis of an item fire typically involves 500 repetitions of the 
calculations, each with different sets of input data. In addition to these repetitions, 
different scenarios may also be defined. In this study a total of 5 scenarios are 
considered for each fire, each involving different detector configurations (with 
different activation temperatures and spacings). For each set of input data, the 
calculations are also carried out for each of these five scenarios. Therefore, for each 





1.3 Literature Review 
A search of literature relating to single escape routes did not reveal a great depth of 
published information. Barnett (1987) reviews the separation required between 
different egress routes (to allow them to be defined as separate), but is based on 
densely occupied escape routes, and relatively slow travel speeds. Further, it does not 





2 EGRESS VIA SINGLE ESCAPE ROUTES – CODE 
REQUIREMENTS 
New Zealand was one of the first countries in which specific fire engineering design 
was permitted, with the New Zealand Building Code in 1992 permitting the 
development of alternative designs instead of following the earlier prescriptive code. 
The New Zealand Building Code states the primary requirements for fire safety in 
clauses C1, C2, C3 and C4. These requirements are given in the form of objectives, 
not prescriptive rules, and are included in the Appendices, Section 9. One means of 
compliance with the Building Code requirements may be achieved through producing 
a fire design that complies with the Acceptable Solutions C/AS1, published by the 
Building Industry Authority (2001). Given the range of situations to which the 
solutions may be applied, there is some variation, but generally the requirements are 
given in a prescriptive form. These Acceptable Solutions include a selection of rules 
and numbers which can not easily be quantified, and little justification for the limits 
are provided. Therefore, as most fire safety designs use the Acceptable Solutions 
C/AS1 as the initial foundation for the design, with specific design only undertaken 
for particular aspects and comparison with the Acceptable Solutions, it can be difficult 
to propose an alternative design which is contrary to these particular rules. 
The purpose of this study is to assess the background and design implications to the 
rule that limits the number of people who may be served by a single means of escape 
to 50, restricts the length of their path to reach that escape, and permits increases in 
that path length when automatic fire detection and/or suppression systems are 
installed. 
As such rules are not usually isolated in their occurrence, similar limitations are 
expected to occur in other design codes around the world. Section 3 identifies and 
compares the limits placed by various fire safety code documents on the number of 





restrictions on that route. 
2.1 New Zealand Acceptable Solutions C/AS1 
The limit placed by the New Zealand Acceptable Solutions C/AS1 on the number of 
people served by a single escape route is 50 people. 
Maximum permissible travel distances vary with the occupancy of the space. They are 
usually defined by the familiarity of the occupants with the space, their environmental 
awareness (awake, asleep), the fire hazard, and the alarm system provided to notify 
them of fire. In shops and hotels, where occupants are not expected to be familiar with 
escape routes from the space, travel distances are slightly reduced. This reduction 
appears to be related to greater numbers of people using escape routes, resulting in 
greater congestions and slower travel speeds. Working and residential spaces, where 
familiarity is greatest, and fewer people are present, have the greatest permissible 
travel distances. Even greater travel distances are permissible when the space is only 
intermittently occupied (such as plant rooms, recognising the lower probability of a 
space being occupied during a fire and the faster travel speed of the few people who 
may be present). Where significant quantities of highly combustible goods are stored 
(likely to result in an ultra fast fire growth rate), the permitted travel distance is 
significantly reduced. Where occupants may be sleeping, and are restrained (either by 
disability, age, health, or detention), both smoke detectors and sprinklers are 
mandatory. 
As noted earlier, the travel distances permitted are limited by the choice of directions 
available. If escape is only possible in only one direction, the travel distance to either 
reach a safe place or a choice of egress routes is defined as dead end open path 
length. If two directions of escape are possible, then the distance to reach a safe path 
or safe place is called total open path length. 
The escape route widths from such spaces are required as follows  for horizontal 





more than 50 people, or disabled people may be present, the minimum width is 
850 mm. Therefore, a route of 850 mm wide may serve up to 121 people if there is 
also a second way out. Door frames may impinge up to 125 mm on the required width 
of the escape route, although the minimum clear open width of the door is 600 mm for 
a 700 mm wide route, and 760 mm for a 850 mm wide route. 
The permissible travel distances, both dead end open path and total open path, 
including the allowable increases for different means of detection are summarised in 
Table 2.1. Where both smoke detectors and sprinklers are installed, the travel distance 
benefits are usually additive.  
Separated escape routes, ie where there are two or more open paths, are defined as 
follows in the Acceptable Solutions, paragraph 3.8.3: 
Where two or more open paths are required, they shall be separated from 
each other, and remain separated until reaching an exitway or final exit. 
Separation shall be achieved by diverging (from the point where two escape 
routes are required), at an angle no less than 90º until separated by: 
a) A distance of at least 8.0 m, or 
b) Smoke separations and smoke control doors. 
2.2 Scottish Regulations:  
The Scottish Regulations (Building Regulations: Technical Standards Part E) allow a 
minimum of 60 people to be served by a single escape route. 
The separation required between the two routes is defined as follows: 
Where more than one exit is required the directions of travel from any point 





a) diverge at an angle of at least 45º 
b) diverge at an angle of less than 45º but be protected from each other by a 
wall or partition 
i) having at least 30 minutes fire resistance; and 
ii) with any opening which is protected by a fire door having at least 
30 minutes fire resistance; or 
c) be combined for a distance not exceeding that allowed for a single 
direction of travel and then diverge to 2 exits at an angle of at least 45º 
plus 21/20 for every metre in the single direction of travel, except – 
where more than one exit is required from a room, storey or space each 
exit must be separated from the other as if the distance allowed for single 
direction of travel did not extend outwith the room, storey or space. 
Escape route widths are based on the requirement for 5.3 mm per person, but not less 
than 1000 mm if serving up to 100 people. The door on such an escape route may 
reduce this width to a minimum of 750 mm. 
The permissible escape route lengths for the Scottish Regulations are given in Table 
2.2. 
2.3 England & Wales Regulations: 
The legislative background for England and Wales appears to be similar to New 
Zealand. The Approved Documents are one way, but not the only way, of meeting the 
requirements of the Building Regulations. These approved documents allow 60 people 
in a dead end, provided that the storey exit can be reached within the dead end travel 





occupancies (2A in these regulations, equivalent to SC and SD in the New Zealand 
Acceptable Solutions). 
Horizontal travel and vertical travel widths are required to be 5 mm per occupant, but 
not less than 750 mm for up to 50 people, or 850 mm per exit for 110 people. Dead 
end travel distance limits are given in Table 2.3. Similarly to the Scottish Regulations, 
dead end travel finishes when egress routes diverge at 45º (rather than 90º as required 
by the New Zealand Acceptable Solutions). 
2.4 USA Requirements (from UBC 1997) 
UBC 1997 typically allows no more than 50 people in a dead end, but the number 
does vary with the occupancy. Occupancies with the 50 limit include assembly areas, 
classrooms, and shops. The permissible travel distances and numbers of people in 
dead end spaces for this code are summarised in Table 2.4. Travel path widths for 
horizontal travel require 5.08 mm per person, but for hazardous occupancies, this is 
doubled (10.16 mm per person). Doors serving 10 or more people to be 914 mm 
nominal width, or 813 mm clear width. 
It should be noted that unlike the other codes described above, the travel distances for 
dead end travel not are reduced from those for non-dead end travel.  
Access to exits is not permitted to be interrupted by intervening rooms (not including 
foyers etc), unless there is only one way out of the room.  
2.5 USA Requirements from NFPA 101: Life Safety Code 2000 
The following requirements were obtained from Coté (2000), the Life Safety Code 
Handbook, which in addition to containing the complete text of NFPA 101, also 
includes a commentary. 





definitions. The definitions from the Life Safety Handbook, paragraph A.7.5.1.6, are 
as follows: 
A common path of travel exists where a space is arranged so that occupants 
within that space are able to travel in only one direction to reach any of the 
exits or to reach the point at which the occupants have the choice of two paths 
of travel to remote exits. 
While a dead end is similar to a common path of travel, a dead end can exist 
where there is no path of travel from an occupied space but can also exist 
where an occupant enters a corridor thinking there is an exit at the end and, 
finding none, is forced to retrace his or her path to reach a choice of exits. 
In the following text, the term dead end will be used to refer to the common path of 
travel situation defined above, this being the meaning of the term as used in most 
other documents, particularly including the Acceptable Solutions to the New Zealand 
Building Code. 
Typically, some benefit is given where sprinklers are installed, but there is no such 
effect where an automatic fire alarm system is provided. Often, while sprinklers are 
indicated as a requirement, the option of not providing them appears to be available 
due to the alternative travel distance limits where they are not installed. 
Dual escape routes are typically required from each floor, however there is typically 
no limit given within the text for the number of people who may be within a dead end 
or common path of travel within the floor, and there are no rules covering the 
required divergence of escape routes. The limit is on the actual travel distance. Travel 
distances and occupancy information from this code is given in Table 2.5. 
  
Dead End Open Path (m) Total Open Path (m) Route Width 
Allowances 
Occupancy Description 
Manual Heat Smoke Sprinkler Manual Heat Smoke  Sprinkler Corridor Door  
Working, Normal Hazard WL 24  28.8 48 48 60 72  120  120  7 mm/p 
850 mm 
760 mm 





IA 36  43.2 72 72 72  86.4 144  144  7 mm/p 
850 mm 
760 mm 




18  21.2 36 36 45  54  90  90  7 mm/p 
850 mm 
760 mm 
Public, in open air CO 36  36 36 36 90  90  90 90  7 mm/p 
850 mm 
760 mm 
Sleeping, familiar (rented 
apartment, or own home) 
SR, SH1 24  26.4 36 36 60  66  90 90  7 mm/p 
850 mm 
760 mm 
Sleeping, unfamiliar (hotel 
etc) 
SA 18  20 36 36 45  50  67.5  67.5  7 mm/p 
850 mm 
760 mm 
Sleeping, detained or in 
care 
SC, SD NP2  NP 18² 18² NP NP 45  45  7 mm/p 
1200 mm 
1200 mm
Table 2.1 : New Zealand Acceptable Solutions C/AS1 for Single Means of Escape 
Note: 1. Where an evacuation scheme is required to be approved by the NZ Fire Service (typically when there are more than 3 
household units in the building) a local alerting smoke alarm is usually required. 
2. NP = Not Permitted  all SC and SD occupancies are required to be sprinklered and have smoke detectors. 
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Path Widths Occupancy (description) NZ equivalent 
Purpose Group 
Permitted travel distance in Dead 
End (m) 
Permitted Total Open Path 
travel distance (m) 
Corridor Door 
Institutional SC, SD 9  15 18  32 5.3 mm/p 
1200 mm 
750 mm 
Residential SA, SR 15 32 5.3 mm/p 
1000 mm 
750 mm 
Flats and Maisonettes sub-group SA, SR 7.5 m from front door to stair 30 m from front door to stair 5.3 mm/p 
1000 mm 
750 mm 
Shops and Commercial CS, CM, and 
WL 
15, but only 9 m within a mall less 
than 3 storeys high 
32 5.3 mm/p 
1200 mm 
750 mm 
Assembly (not part of SC), 
including schools 
CL 15 32 5.3 mm/p 
1000 mm 
750 mm 
Industrial WL 18 45 5.3 mm/p 
1000 mm 
750 mm 
Low hazard storage WL/IA 18-30 45 5.3 mm/p 
1000 mm 
750 mm 
High hazard storage WF/ID 15-18 32-45 5.3 mm/p 
1000 mm 
750 mm 
Open sided carparks IA 18 45 5.3 mm/p 
1000 mm 
750 mm 
Rooftop plantroom IA 60 100 5.3 mm/p 
1000 mm 
750 mm 
Table 2.2 : Scottish Regulations on Escape Routes 
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Occupancy (description) NZ equivalent Purpose 
Group 
Dead end open path 
Travel Distance (m) 
Total Open Path 
Travel Distance (m) 
Corridor Widths 
Institutional, including recreational 
facilities 
SC, SD 9 18 5 mm/p 
750 mm for 50 people, 
850 mm for 110 people 
1050 mm for 220 people 
Other Residential (bedrooms) SA, SR 9 18 5 mm/p 
750 mm for 50 
850 mm for 110  
1050 mm for 220 
Office WL 18 45 5 mm/p 
750 mm for 50 
850 mm for 110  
1050 mm for 220 
Shop and Commercial CM 18 45 5 mm/p 
750 mm for 50 
850 mm for 110  
1050 mm for 220 
Assembly and Recreation, including 
schools 
CL 18 32-45 5 mm/p 
750 mm for 50 
850 mm for 110  
1050 mm for 220 
Industrial WL 25 45 5 mm/p 
750 mm for 50 
850 mm for 110  
1050 mm for 220 
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Storage IA/ID 25 45 5 mm/p 
750 mm for 50 
850 mm for 110  
1050 mm for 220 
High hazard WF 9 18 5 mm/p 
750 mm for 50 
850 mm for 110  
1050 mm for 220 
Plant Room, including open air IA 9-60 35-100 5 mm/p 
750 mm for 50 
850 mm for 110  
1050 mm for 220 







Number of People 
permitted in Dead 
end 
Open Path Length Open Path Length 
with Smoke 
Detectors 
Open Path Length 
with sprinklers 
Egress Route Widths 
Assembly CS/CL 50 (though only 
10 if on a 
balcony) 
60.96 m 60.96 m 76.2 m 5.08 mm/p 
914 mm < 50 
1118 mm > 50 
Business WL 30 60.96 m 60.96 m 76.2 m 5.08 mm/p 
914 mm < 50 
1118 mm > 50 
Educational CS/CL 50 22.86 m 27.432 m 33.528 m 5.08 mm/p 
914 mm < 50 
1118 mm > 50 
Institutional SC/SD 6-10 30.48 m 30.48 m 76.2 m 5.08 mm/p 
914 mm < 50 
1118 mm > 50  
Mercantile CM 50 60.96 m 60.96 m 76.2 m 5.08 mm/p 
914 mm < 50 
1118 mm > 50 
Residential SR/SA 10 60.96 m 60.96 m 76.2 m 5.08 mm/p 
914 mm < 50 
1118 mm > 50 









Number of People 
permitted in Dead end 
Dead End 
Path Length  










Assembly CL 50 on a balcony, otherwise 
no limit 
6.1 m if > 50 
people 
23 m if < 50 
people 
6.1 m if > 50 
people 
23 m if < 50 
people 
45 m 60 m 5 mm/p 
810 mm door 
Educational CL no limit indicated, 
although each level 
requires 2 means of escape 
23 m 30 m  45 m 60 m 5 mm/p 
810 mm door 
Day-Care CS no limit indicated, but 
each level requires 2 
means of escape 
23 m 30 m 45 m 60 m 5 mm/p 
810 mm door 
Health Care SC no limit indicated, 
however each level 
requires 2 means of escape 
up to 30 m, 
with corridor 
dead end 
limit of 9.1 m 
up to 30 m, 
with corridor 
dead end limit 
of 9.1 m 
45 m 60 m 5 mm/p if sprinklers 
13 mm/p if no 
sprinklers 









Number of People 
permitted in Dead end 
Dead End 
Path Length  









Travel Path Widths 
Ambulatory 
Health Care 
SC at least 2 exits required 
from each floor, but no 
indication of number of 
people in a dead end 
23 m 30 m 45 m 60 m 5 mm/p 




SD at least 2 exits required 
from each floor, but no 
indication of number of 
people in a dead end 
15 m 30 m 45 m 60 m 5 mm/p 
810 mm door 
Residential  
Hotels 
SA 2 exits from each sleeping 
room unless sprinklers 
provided 
10.7 m 15 m 53 m 99 m 5 mm/p 
810 mm door 
Residential  
Apartments 
SR 2 exits from each sleeping 
room unless sprinklers 
provided. 
10.7 m 15 m 53 m 99 m 5 mm/p 









Number of People 
permitted in Dead end 
Dead End 
Path Length  















SA 2 escape routes required 
from each storey, and two 
escape routes from each 
sleeping room. Sprinklers 
usually required 
no limit no limit no limit no limit 5 mm/p 





SA 2 escape routes required 
from each storey, and two 
escape routes from each 






38 m (not 
permitted) 
99 m 5 mm/p 





SA 2 escape routes required 
from each storey, and two 
escape routes from each 
sleeping room. Sprinklers 
usually required 
33 m 49 m 53 m 99 m 5 mm/p 
810 mm door 
Mercantile CM no limit on numbers, 
provided travel distance 
requirements met 
23 m 30 m 30 m 60 m 5 mm/p 









Number of People 
permitted in Dead end 
Dead End 
Path Length  









Travel Path Widths 
Business WL up to 100 people may be 
served by a single 
horizontal route, provided 
total travel distance to 
exterior within the limit, 
and no other spaces using 
exitway. Or up to 30 
people each level, using 
and sharing stairs, no 
higher than 3rd floor. 
23 m 30 m 60 m 91 m 5 mm/p 
810 mm door 
Industrial WL-WF typically 2 exits from each 
level. Low and ordinary 
hazard permitted to have 
single if within dead end 
limit 
15 m (0 m if 
high hazard) 
30 m (15 m if 
high hazard) 
23  90 m 
depending 
on hazard 




10 mm/p if high 
hazard 
810 mm door 
Storage WM As with industrial 
situations, low hazard 
storage occupancies 
permitted to have single 
escape route. Ordinary 
hazard escape route 
required to be within dead 
end limit. 
15 m (0 m if 
high hazard) 
no limits for 
low hazard 
0  30 m 
depending on 
hazard 
no limits for 
low hazard 
23 60 m 
depending 
on hazard 
no limit for 
low hazard 
30  122 m 
depending on 
hazard 
no limit for 
low hazard 
5 mm/p 
10 mm/p if high 
hazard 
810 mm door 
Table 2.5 : NFPA 101 Means of Escape Requirements
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2.6 Comparison of the Codes 
A comparison of dead end and total open path travel distance limits for different 
occupancies and detection methods, including number of people who are permitted to 
be provided with only a single means of escape is given in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7. 
These show that the New Zealand Acceptable Solutions place the most weight on the 
benefits of automatic alarm and suppression systems  the only other Codes which 
make any allowances for these are the UBC and NFPA 101, which permit increased 
travel distances in certain occupancies where smoke detectors or sprinklers are 
provided.  
The UBC has the greatest range of permitted numbers of occupants in a dead end, 
varying from 6 to 50. The England & Wales Documents permit up to 60 people in a 
dead end in all groups, except for institutional purpose groups where this is reduced 
to 30. The New Zealand Acceptable Solutions and the Scottish Regulations each have 
single limits of 50 and 60 respectively. The life safety code, NFPA 101 places few 
limits on the numbers of people served by a common path of travel, requiring them 
to only be within an appropriate travel distance. Up to 100 people in a working 
environment may be served by a single escape route provided travel distances are 
within relatively stringent limits. 
Egress widths appear to have little variation, although there is some difference in the 
way doors are treated. For New Zealand, Scotland and the UBC, doors are permitted 
to reduce the width of the egress route, but no such allowance is mentioned in the 
Approved Documents for use in England and Wales or in the NFPA Life Safety 
Code. This, however, is reflected in the required width of the egress route. These 
route widths are also dependent on accessibility requirements, particularly for 
wheelchair users. For simplicity, all the widths shown in the tables assume that 
provision for disabled users is not required in this situation, particularly as the 
requirements for these provisions are not stated in the fire egress documents. The 
obstruction or reduction of an egress route by a door way is usually permitted 
because it is recognised that it is not reasonable to fit a doorway into a corridor and 
achieve the same clear opening width as the width of the corridor. Further, reference 
to Nelson & MacLennan (1995) indicates that there are varying boundary layer 
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widths to different elements within an egress route. The effective design width of a 
corridor or ramp is 400 mm less than the clear width, while the effective design width 
of a door or archway is only 300 mm less than the clear width of the frame. This 
implies that a door or archway may reduce the clear width of the egress route by up 
to 100 mm (ie 50 mm each side) without reducing the effective design width and 
hence the route capacity. 
2.7 Egress Times 
Finally, consider how the various provisions described above correspond to 
evacuation times. There are two periods of egress that contribute to the egress time. 
The first of these is the time required to travel to the door, and the second is the time 
associated with queuing to pass through the door along with the other occupants of the 
room. It is usually assumed that the occupants are evenly spread throughout the space, 
so the first person will tend to reach the door almost immediately. If the time required 
for the last person from the most remote corner of the room to reach the door is 
greater than the queuing time, there will be no queue left by the time they reach the 
door, and the egress time is the travel time. If the queuing time is greater than that 
travel time, then it is assumed that a queue is formed almost immediately, and that the 
egress time is dependent solely on the queuing time. These times are given in Table 
2.8. The calculations have been undertaken using the principles described by Nelson 
and MacLennan (1995), and initially appeared to indicate that where 50 people are 
required to pass through a 600 mm wide door, the egress time may exceed 2 minutes, 




















Table 3-14.5 in Nelson MacLennan (1995) indicates that the maximum 
specific flow through a door, Fsm is 1.3 persons/s/m of effective width, and 
The typical boundary layer thickness for a door is 15 cm (0.15 m).  
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However, this boundary layer appears to be excessive in the calculation of the 
effective width for these doors, and it is proposed that the effective width should not 
be taken less than 530 mm. A local constriction to no less than this width permits one 
person to pass without restricting speed. Even so, the queuing time for 50 people 
(refer Table 2.8) is typically 1¼  to 1½ minutes, in comparison to a travel time of ½ a 
minute or less. 
The travel times are calculated using a travel speed of 1.2 m/s for low density 
occupancies such as work places. Where the occupant density is higher, such as in 
crowd occupancies, this speed is reduced to 0.8 m/s. For more information on the 
background to selection of these travel speeds, refer to section 3.6. 
This indicates that the travel distances have little or no effect on the evacuation times 
for this magnitude of occupant load, and it raises the question whether increases in 
travel distance due to automatic detector installation are really effective in 
maintaining a similar level of life safety. In fact, for most of the situations in the table, 
the travel distance only starts controlling the egress time when the occupant load is 20 
people or fewer (this is the number given in the second to last column of Table 2.8, 
based on the travel distances permitted where no automatic detectors are installed). 
Only the wider path widths required by UBC come closest to not controlling the 
egress rate, and even with those widths, the travel distances are still 40% shorter than 
would result in those controlling egress times. Considering the possibility of slower 
travel speeds, these could be as low as 0.1 m/s, and often as low as 0.3 m/s before 
queuing is avoided. 
To avoid queuing, door widths of 2-3 m are typically required (as indicated in Table 
2.8), and would clearly have the advantage of ensuring greater separation between 
someone egressing and a possible fire. 
One of the few possible arguments for allowing increased egress distances where 
automatic detection is provided, is that assuming a relatively even distribution of 
occupants throughout a space with a single escape route, is that where manual 
detection only is provided, occupants are required to be closer to the escape route, and 
hence may have an increased awareness of a fire that threatens this. This argument 
cannot easily be addressed, except to indicate that in the following study, awareness 
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of the fire by occupants is assumed to be triggered by smoke that spreads throughout 
the space, rather than by cues associated with proximity to a fire. There is also some 
doubt as to whether cues other than smoke would be effective for occupants permitted 
to be 20 m from the location of the fire (a possible situation complying with the 
Acceptable Solutions). 
This report will review the separation required between a fire and the escape route to 
permit egress, though will not specifically address the separation between two 
separate escape routes.
  
Dead end open paths Total Open Paths Occupancy 
Type 
Code No. in 





NZ 50 24 28.8 48 48 60 72 120 120 760 850 
Scot 60 15-18 15-18 15-18 15-18 32-45 32-45 32-45 32-45 750 1000 
Eng. & Wales 60 18 18 18 18 45 45 45 45 750 750 




NFPA 101 NL 23 23 23 30 60 60 60 91 810 810 
NZ 50 18 21.2 36 36 45 54 90 90 760 850 
Scot 60 15 15 15 15 32 32 32 32 750 1000 
Eng. & Wales 60 15-18 15-18 15-18 15-18 32-45 32-45 32-45 32-45 750 750 





NFPA 101 NL 6.1, 23 6.1, 23 6.1, 23 6.1 or 23 45 45 45 60 810 810 
NZ 50 18 21.2 36 36 45 54 90 90 760 850 
Scot 60 9-15 9-15 9-15 9-15 32 32 32 32 750 1000 
Eng. & Wales 60 18 18 18 18 45 45 45 45 750 750 
UBC 50 60.96 60.96 60.96 76.2 60.96 60.96 60.96 76.2 813 914 
Shops 
NFPA 101 NL 23 23 23 30 30 30 30 60 810 810 
NZ 50 18 21.2 36 36 45 54 90 90 760 850 
Scot 60 15 15 15 15 32 32 32 32 750 1000 
Eng. & Wales 60 18 18 18 18 45 45 45 45 1600 1600 
UBC 50 22.86 22.86 27.4 33.6 45.7 45.7 53.3 68.6 813 914 
Schools 
NFPA 101 NL 23 23 23 30 45 45 45 60 810 810 
Table 2.6 : Comparison of Codes - Active Purpose Groups 
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Dead end open path Total Open Path Occupancy 
Type 
Code No. in 
dead 





NZ 50 18 20 36 36 45 49.5 67.5 67.5 760 850 
Scot 60 15 15 15 15 32 32 32 32 750 1000 
Eng. & Wales 60 9 9 9 9 18 18 18 18 750 750 




NFPA 101 NL 10.7 10.7 10.7 15 53 53 53 99 810 810 
NZ 50 24 26.4 36 36 60 66 90 90 760 850 
Scot 60 15 15 15 15 32 32 32 32 750 1000 
Eng. & Wales 60 9 9 9 9 18 18 18 18 75 750 




NFPA 101 NL 10.7 10.7 10.7 15 53 53 53 99 810 810 
NZ 50 NP NP 18 18 NP NP 45 45 760 850 
Scot 60 9-15 9-15 9-15 9-15 18-32 18-32 18-32 18-32 750 1000 
Eng. & Wales 60 9 9 9 9 18 18 18 18 750 1000 






NFPA 101 NL 15-30 15-30 15-30 30 45 45 45 60 810 810 
Table 2.7: Comparison of Codes - Sleeping Purpose Groups 
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Dead end open path Travel 
Time (s) 
Total Open Path Travel Time (s) Occupancy 
Type 
Code No. in 
dead 










New Zealand 50 20 24 40 40 50 60 100 100 128 13 2223 
Scot 60 13 13 13 13 27 27 27 27 103 8 3992 
Eng. & Wales 60 15 15 15 15 38 38 38 38 132 10 3377 




NFPA 101 (50) 19 19 19 25 50 50 50 76 94 13 2307 
NZ 50 23 27 45 45 56 68 113 113 128 15 2009 
Scot 60 19 19 19 19 40 40 40 40 103 12 2762 
Eng. & Wales 60 19 19 19 19 40 40 40 40 132 12 2762 





NFPA 101 (50) 8 8 8 8 56 56 56 75 94 5 5344 
NZ 50 23 27 45 45 56 68 113 113 128 15 2009 
Scot 60 11 11 11 11 40 40 40 40 103 7 4403 
Eng. & Wales 60 23 23 23 23 56 56 56 56 132 15 2351 
UBC 50 76 76 76 95 76 76 76 95 75 52 805 
Shops 
NFPA 101 (50) 29 29 29 38 38 38 38 75 94 19 1638 
NZ 50 23 27 45 45 56 68 113 113 128 15 2009 
Scot 60 19 19 19 19 40 40 40 40 103 12 2762 
Eng. & Wales 60 23 23 23 23 56 56 56 56 38 35 2351 
UBC 50 29 29 34 42 57 57 67 86 75 19 1646 
Schools 
NFPA 101 NL 29 29 29 38 56 56 56 75 94 19 1638 
Table 2.8 : Comparison of Codes Egress Times from Active Occupancies using Nelson MacLennan 
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3 ESCAPE FROM THE FIRECELL OF FIRE ORIGIN 
There are a number of factors that affect the characteristics of the fire, the conditions 
in the firecell, and the likely response of the occupants of the firecell, which all need 
to be identified as part of the analysis. 
In considering the occupant avoidance behaviour, the following phases of awareness  
must be addressed. Firstly, there is the means of detection of the fire, whether by the 
occupants or by automatic detectors, resulting in a warning to other occupants. Then, 
the reaction to that notification needs to be considered, and how long it might take the 
occupants of the firecell to decide to move. Finally, the actual movement time must be 
considered, both the travel time to the door, and the time required for everyone to pass 
through the door out of the space. 
Whether the evacuation is successful or not depends on whether tenability is 
maintained while people are still in the firecell, and whether the fire obstructs the 
route, either directly or through excessive radiation from an adjacent location. 
Tenability is related to exposure of the occupants to smoke and heat from the fire. It is 
dependent on the object which is burning, and hence tends to be related to the use of 
the firecell. Similarly, the occupancy type also affects the pre-movement time and 
hence the time required to evacuate the firecell. Where there is only a single escape 
route, the critical scenario is expected to be due to skin damage from radiation from a 
fire immediately adjacent to the escape route, although this may not be the only cause 
of failure to evacuate. This assumption has been made because of the dramatic 
increase permitted in the total open path travel distance during which the occupants 
are assumed to be exposed to smoke, but are free to move away from the vicinity of 
the fire. 
The approach followed in this assessment is as follows: 
Assume a single, open plan room, being the firecell. 
For a variety of room geometries, first identify the conditions that will mean 
that the room is no longer tenable. These will be in the form of a hot layer 
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height and temperature, and a level of heat radiation to the egress route from a 
fire near the exit.  
From these conditions, various fire scenarios can be analysed to find at what 
time these conditions are reached. These scenarios will include standard t² 
fires, as well as results from fire tests of typical items, such as those published 
by Särdqvist (1993), and those on the NIST web-site (2002). For each 
scenario, the alerting time can be determined for each type of detector 
(occupant, heat detector, smoke detector, or even sprinkler). In the case of a 
sprinkler system, the effect of the sprinkler on the fire heat release rate must be 
considered. Here, it will conservatively be assumed that it will control the fire, 
ie preventing further increase of the heat release rate, maintaining it at the 
level reached at sprinkler activation. Finally, this leaves the time available for 
evacuation (including pre-movement activities). The time required for pre-
movement activities can vary hugely, and may be influenced by the occupants 
perception of danger. As this perception is difficult to quantify, let alone its 
effect on the pre-movement time, the effect of conditions in the firecell will 
not generally be taken on the pre-movement time. This then leaves the time 
available for evacuation. It is intended to compare the actual evacuation times 
available to assess egress requirements in the form of total occupant numbers, 
egress distances, and escape route widths. 
The following sections address the above points, and provide the background to the 
spreadsheet tools which have been developed for this study. As has been noted earlier, 
many of the parameters have been assigned a distribution to allow the influence of 
each property on the final result to be determined. 
3.1 The Room 
First, it is necessary to determine a physical environment in which to place the 
occupants and the fire. For simplicity, the firecell is assumed to be a single space 
without full height partitions, and having several routes within the space to reach the 
single egress door. This provides a single volume for the smoke to fill. Subdivision of 
the space by full height partitions could delay occupant awareness of the fire if it 
occurred within an unoccupied space, and smoke movement through the space would 
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also be influenced by the arrangement of partitions and openings. For the assessment 
of travel distances, orthogonal travel is assumed. This is travel from a point 1 m from 
the furthest corner of the room, to the door in the corner diagonally opposite, first 
travelling across the room, then turning through 90º to travel directly to the door. This 
conservatively allows for movement around partitions and furniture. The plan 
dimensions of this room will be assumed to be between 5 m and 25 m, and the ceiling 
height between 2.4 m and 3.5 m high. 
3.2 Requirements for Successful Evacuation 
There are two products of fire that may prevent people from evacuating from a space. 
The first of these is the hot layer, which may descend below head height, obscuring 
visibility and endangering the health of occupants who may inhale it. Even if it does 
not descend to this level, the temperature of the hot layer may result in exposure of the 
occupants to excessive radiation. The second is radiation from a fire in front of or 
adjacent to the final exit, preventing occupants from passing it to get out of the room. 
3.2.1 Smoke Layer 
As noted previously, when the hot layer descends below 2 m, conditions in the firecell 
are assumed to be untenable. 
To calculate the predicted smoke layer thickness and height, particularly for non-t² 
fires, the smoke production rates, and hence the filling rates must be assessed. A 
method for doing this is given by Cooper (1995) based on first principles. 
The total mass flow in the plume, and the temperature of the plume at a distance z 
above the fire can be estimated using the following equations: 
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Equation 3.3 
The overall temperature of the hot layer can be calculated by determining the total 
mass, volume, and hence the density, which can then be related to an average 
temperature. Radiation from the hot layer is assessed in the next section. 
3.2.2 Radiation 
Radiation from a fire, or from any other source, causes the skin to increase in 
temperature, and the level of pain, or severity of damage in extreme cases is related to 
the temperature of the skin. 
The SFPE (2000) has, in reference to work carried out by a variety of people, 
developed and documented a method by which the damage to skin may be predicted. 
Experiments have been carried out correlating the time to pain in relation to the 
exposure to radiant heat flux, and also identifying when burn damage starts to occur. 
The temperature of the skin can be related both to the level of pain, and to the level of 
damage experienced by the skin. An equation has been developed allowing the 
temperature of the skin to be calculated at any depth after exposure to constant radiant 
heat flux for a certain period of time. Pain has been shown not occur where the heat 
flux is less than 1.7 kW/m². The thermal response of the skin, which is governed by 
the thermal inertia, varies with the radiation intensity. Pain is broadly related to skin 
temperature, with burn damage generally occurring when the temperature reaches 44 
ºC at 80µm depth below the skin surface. At lower radiation exposure levels, 10% of 
the damage may be done during the cooling period, and at higher radiation levels, the 
cooling period can account for up to 35% of the damage. As it is assumed that 
temperatures should not reach these levels in the first place because this would mean 
failure of the design, and skin temperature should not continue to rise once the heat 
source is removed, it has not be considered necessary to include for cooling. Equation 



















































α =  
Equation 3.4 
A simpler correlation, given in Equation 3.5, calculates the time to pain that is 



















Where S.F. is the safety factor (2 if "rq&< 6 kW/m², 4 if 
"
rq&> 6 kW/m²) 
A safety factor is usually required to be used in the fire safety design, however this is 
not appropriate for a study of this nature, in which all the effects are to be combined 
without prejudice to one means of failure or another, giving everything a balanced 
weighting. In this study, it will be conservatively assumed that the exposure time will 
be taken as the time that the occupant is exposed to any radiation flux greater than 1.7 
kW/m².  The flux level will be taken as the maximum flux level during that time. 
Skin Properties are given in Table 3.1, as determined by Weaver and Stoll, reported in 
SFPE (2000). Although thermal conductivity was found to vary with temperature, and 
whether or not the skin is being heated or cooled, it was shown that a constant value 
during heating provided satisfactory results that compared well with the experimental 
data. 
Property Symbol Value Units 
Thermal Conductivity ks 0.5878 W/m-K 
Volumetric Heat Capacity ρscs 4,186,800 J/m³-K 
Basal Layer Depth (at which pain occurs) xs 0.00008 m 
Table 3.1 : Skin Properties 
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The actual temperature of the skin is then compared with the temperature at which 
damage starts occurring, 44 ºC. When it is predicted that this temperature will be 
exceeded, evacuation is assumed to be unsuccessful. 
An assessment of the skin temperatures for passing fires of various sizes using the 
different equations with and without safety factors has lead to the generation of the 
graph in Figure 3.1. 
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Figure 3.1 : Fire Size and Travel Speed to Successfully Pass at a Range of 
Separations 
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A similar calculation can be undertaken to assess skin temperature response to 
radiation from the hot layer. However, review of the results indicates that it is simpler 
to limit the radiation flux to 2.5 kW/m², for which the time to pain is approximately 
30 seconds. 
3.2.3 Combination Effects 
Finally, much of the following sections relating to single escape routes from a firecell 
assume that the fire is located close to the final escape point from the firecell. The 
actual probability of the fire occurring, and also occurring in such a location should be 
put into context, by assessing the area in which this fire could occur and comparing it 
to the total area within the firecell. The probability of a fire in that location versus any 
other location in the firecell can therefore be related to the area of the room being 
considered.  
In a specific design, it should also be possible to consider the actual layout of the 
space, and particular types of furniture that may be positioned in that location, eg 
work-stations, chairs, or sofas. Data on these particular items can be sourced from a 
report prepared by Särdqvist (1993), and from the NIST web-site.  
3.3 Means of Detection 
This will depend on the detectors installed, their location relative to the fire, and the 
characteristics of the fire. If no detectors are installed, then the occupants are required 
to become the detection system. There is little published guidance on when a fire is 
most likely to be manually detected, so it will be necessary to make an assumption 
based on alertness of occupants, and cues available to occupants. 
3.3.1 Automatic Detection by Heat Detectors and Sprinklers 
Activation of heat detectors and sprinklers may be predicted through predicting their 
temperatures when exposed to a time dependent fire. In this assessment, the method 
will be that used by the DETACT procedure in FPETool, described by Deal (1994). 
Equation 3.6 gives the ceiling jet temperatures and velocities, assuming the detector 
































For each time step, the above temperatures and velocities are calculated, and the 
temperature of the detector is calculated using the following relationship (also from 
Deal (1994)). Note that this equation actually gives the temperature rise experienced 
by the detector (rather than the detector temperature at the new time) per unit time 
exposure to the gas flow. The new detector temperature is therefore calculated using 
the relationship given in Equation 3.9. Although the results are not as accurate for 
longer time steps, they are still within approximately 10% of the times calculated by 
FPETool. The verification of these calculations has been carried out in Appendices, 
Section 10. 
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Equation 3.9 
The time required for the smoke in the plume to travel from the fire to the detector, 
usually known as the lag time, can be calculated using Mowrer and Newman, as 






























These lag times are usually small in comparison to the detector activation time, but 
are given for completeness. 
The properties of heat detectors as used in the analysis are given in Table 3.2. 




Activation temperature, Tact normal 57 ºC 2 ºC  
RTI normal 20 m½s½ 5 m½s½ max: 25 m½s½ 
min: 15 m½s½ 
Detector Spacing, S Scenarios with spacings of 2, 3, 4, 5 & 6 m are 
considered. 
Table 3.2 : Heat Detection Variables 
Note:  For compliance with the Fire Alarm Standard, NZS 4512, heat detectors are 
supposed to cover a maximum area of 36m². Therefore, the spacing range has 
been taken as 2 to 6 m centres. 
For sprinkler activation, the range of variables in Table 3.3 is used, with specific 
scenarios as in Table 3.4. 
Variable Distribution Mean Standard Deviation 
Activation temperature, 
Tact 
normal  67 ºC 2 ºC 
RTI Scenarios with RTI of 80 (fast response) and 120 
(intermediate response) heads are considered most likely 
Head Spacing where 
compliance with 
NZS4541 is appropriate, S 
Scenarios at spacings of 2, 3, & 4 m are reviewed. 
Table 3.3 : Sprinkler System Variables 
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Scenario Head Spacing (m) RTI (m/s)1/2 
1 2 100 
2 3 80 
3 3 100 
4 4 100 
5 4 120 
Table 3.4 : Sprinkler System Scenarios 
3.3.2 Smoke Detector Activation 
While smoke detector activation can be predicted through considering the optical 
density of smoke, the usual correlation involves assuming activation of the detector 
after a temperature rise of 13 ºC.  Schifiliti (1995) notes this as being typically valid 
for flaming fires where such a temperature rise would be expected. Such an 
assumption would not predict detector activation for a smouldering fire. For the fires 
considered in this study, there is sometimes an initial smouldering period, followed by 
flaming combustion. In these situations, provided that the quantity of smoke produced 
is not greater than that usually associated with the low heat release rate (ie resulting in 
no reduction in tenability time), the smoke detector activation time calculated may be 
long, giving a shorter escape time than might otherwise be available. Note that the 
RTI is greater than would usually be used in FPETool, however the larger value is 
required to maintain stability in the calculation where the time step is 20 seconds or 
more. In FPETool, a time step for calculation is usually 1 second, which tends to 
maintain stability for the smaller RTI value. 
Variable Distribution Mean Standard Deviation 
Activation temperature Tact normal 33 ºC 1 ºC 
RTI constant 5 m½s½  
Spacing Scenarios include spacings of 6, 7, 8, 9 & 10 m. 
Table 3.5 : Smoke Detector Characteristics 
The New Zealand Standard, NZS4512, covering the installation of alarm systems 
usually requires the installation of smoke detectors so that the area covered by a 
detector is no greater than 90 m². This code may be contravened by specific design, 
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and the intention of these scenarios is to determine how the spacing affects the 
detection time, and assess how this affects the time available for evacuation. 
3.3.3 Manual Detection 
For manual detection, particularly in larger spaces, smoke is the cue most likely to 
lead to detection of the fire. It is therefore necessary to look at how the smoke layer 
develops, and track its height as part of the tenability study.  
It has been proposed in some specific fire engineering designs, that detection is 
possible when the depth of the smoke layer in the occupied room reaches 5-10% of 
the ceiling height (or 15-20% of the ceiling height in big spaces). However, care 
should be taken in utilising this approach  can occur does not mean will occur.  
In this analysis, as occupants are generally expected to be alert, a range of detection 
times will be considered, from when the smoke layer depth reaches 5% of the ceiling 
height, to when it reaches 20% of the ceiling height. It has also been noted that at 
these times, the radiation from the smoke layer to head height is elevated. As it does 
not seem reasonable for someone not to notice when they are exposed to radiation 
equivalent to that received from the sun at the equator (ie 1 kW/m²), radiation from 
the smoke layer will also be included as a means of detection. The minimum radiation 
detection level will be taken as 0.8 kW/m² received, the average is 1 kW/m², and the 
maximum is 1.2 kW/m². The effect of the range of detection times will be considered 
in the same way that the different automatic detection scenarios are addressed. 
Magnusson (1995) has also suggested an alternative approach. Where direct 
awareness of the fire (due to proximity) is likely, the detection may be based on a 
lognormal distribution with a mean of 10 seconds and a standard deviation of 5. 
Where this proximity is not the case (possibly due to subdivision of the firecell into 
rooms), a survey of fire officers by Magnusson has suggested that the manual 
detection time should be approximately twice that of an automatic detection time. The 
type of detector is not identified. While many of the standardised situations may be 
single rooms, this will not necessarily describe all cases. Therefore, the method 
proposed above relating to the thickness of the smoke layer is suggested as an 
appropriate median between the two scenarios for the general assessment. 
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discovered due to the smoke. As 
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3.4 Automatic Suppression by Sprinklers 
Sprinkler activation may be predicted as noted above, using the procedure for heat 
detector activation. Fire behaviour after sprinkler activation is typically assumed to be 
controlled  ie the fire size does not grow, but continues at the size reached when the 
sprinklers activated. 
3.5 Pre-Movement Time 
There have been several methods developed relating to the assessment of pre-
movement time, however few codes, if any, recommend specific methods to be used. 
Most methods compare the length of the pre-movement time with the information 
available to the occupant of the firecell, with few providing any absolute guidance. 
Sime (1996) identifies that there are a number of factors that determine how long a 
group of people will take to respond to the information available through the alarm 
system, and start evacuating, with the factors considered as indicated in Table 3.6.  
Simes paper also indicates that much further work is needed to verify and calibrate 
the pre-movement times suggested in this paper, however despite this warning, it is 
known to have been used as part of specific fire engineering designs in New Zealand. 
Although Sime does not identify the effect of direct exposure to the fire cues in case 
of a fire in a firecell, it is considered reasonable to compare this with the directive 
announcements. Alerting will occur through activation of either a detector, or of a 
manual call point by someone close by, so the remaining occupants can be expected to 
be alerted both by the alarm bell, and by fire cues with the combination of these 
cues providing as much information as might be provided by live directive public 
announcements to someone remote from the fire.  
Table 3.7 illustrates the assessment of pre-movement times for each of the 
occupancies considered in this study. These include an office (used as an example of a 
work environment), a shop (as an example of a crowd environment, where occupants 
are already moving), and a bar (as an example of a crowd environment where people 
are seated, and will tend to take longer to respond). 
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A uniform distribution has been assigned to the factors B to I, and the basic time A 
has been given a normal distribution with a standard deviation of 10 seconds. 
Factor Title Description and Effect 
A Communications This factor affects the minimum baseline pre-movement 
time, and is based on the alarm system. These are 
assumed to range from an alarm bell, through non-
directive prerecorded PA announcements, Informative 
warning visual displays, and/or live directive PA 
announcements from a control room, possibly 
incorporating CCTV.  
The sum of the following factors is inversely related to the pre-movement time 
B Alertness asleep 1 → 5 awake 
C Mobility low (eg disabled) 1 → 5 high (able bodied) 
D Social Affiliation group 1 → 5 alone (note that a family group will tend to 
take longer to respond, with group dynamics tending to 
retard individual action) 
E Role public 1 → 5 staff (staff, who tend to have greater 
responsibility for a situation, and who may have 
relevant training are will tend to respond quicker than 
the general public) 
F Position lying 1 → 5 moving 
G Commitment high 1 → 5 low (a commitment to finish an action, eg 
completing a purchase, will tend to delay evacuation) 
H Focal Point none 1 → 5 focused (if attention tends to be focused in 
one direction, eg a theatre, like commitment to an 
activity, this will tend to delay response) 
I Familiarity unfamiliar 1 → 5 familiar (choosing the route via which 
to evacuate will take less time if the occupants are 
familiar with the choices) 
Table 3.6 : Factors Affecting Pre-Movement Times 
It has been attempted to relate the effect of the fire size at the time of occupant 
discovery to the pre-movement time using the following method: 
•  Where the detection is better than average (ie the smoke layer depth is 5% of the 
ceiling height), the larger value of Weff, and hence a longer pre-movement time is 
used. Note that the basic response time is still normally distributed as described 
above. 
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•  Where the manual detection time is longer than average (ie the hot layer depth is 
20% of the ceiling height), the shorter value of Weff, and hence a shorter pre-
movement time is used. 
•  Where the average manual detection is used (ie hot layer is 10% of the ceiling 
height), the average value of Weff, and hence an average pre-movement time is 
used. 
•  For automatic detection devices, the full distribution is considered, with both the 
range of factors B to I, as well as the distribution of the basic pre-movement time, 
A is used. 
The pre-movement time, tpre, is then calculated using the following relationships: 
Weff = 5/Avg(B…I) Equation 3.11 
tpre = A x Weff Equation 3.12 
The resulting distribution of the pre-movement time, tpre, is closest to a normal 
distribution, which is illustrated in Figure 3.2, being the pre-movement times for an 
office occupancy. This also shows that the distribution is relatively tight, as indicated 
by the small standard deviation relative to the mean. 
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- Bar  
(CS) 
A 60±30 sec 60±30 sec 60±30 sec 
B 4→5 4→5 2→4 
C 4→5 2→4 2→4 
D 3→5 2→4 1→3 
E 4→5 1→3 1→3 
F 1→3 3→5 1→3 
G 1→3 1→3 1→2 
H 1→3 1→3 1→3 
I 4→5 1→3 2→4 
Avg (B…I) ±std dev 28.0±1.18 27.6±1.15 22.5±1.49 
Weff 1.43 1.79 2.18 
tpre (minutes & seconds 
±standard deviation ) 
1:26±4 1:47±7 2:11±11 
Table 3.7 : Pre-movement Time Calculation 
Further work by Sime has also postulated that additional factors such as population 
density, visual access, enclosure, and complexity of the environment will also affect 
the response of the occupants. The effect of these is difficult, if not impossible to 
assess for the generalised situations being considered in this project. 
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Figure 3.2 : Pre-Movement Time Distribution – Office Occupancy 
New Zealand Legislation, in particular the Fire Service Act, has resulted in the 
requirement that buildings providing accommodation for more than 3 household units, 
or being a place of work for more than 10 people, shall have an evacuation procedure. 
Among the requirements of the evacuation procedure, which must be approved by the 
New Zealand Fire Service, include the carrying out of 6 monthly trial evacuations. 
Trial evacuations are usually unannounced to the majority of the occupants, although 
the Building Warden is usually notified. This process is generally adequate to ensure 
that all occupants can identify the sound of the building fire alarm system (and are 
unlikely to ascribe another meaning to it), and are familiar with the egress routes. In 
such cases, particularly in office tenancies observed by the author, pre-movement 
times can be as little as 15-30 seconds. 
3.6 The Effect of Travel Distance on Travel Time 
The calculation of evacuation times is carried out using Nelson MacLennan (1995). 
The effect of occupant density on the evacuation speed is to be assessed based on 
Fruins Levels of Service.  The densities and flows associated with these levels of 
service are given in Table 3.8. 
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Walkway Fruins Level of Service 
American Units Metric Conversion 
A Flow volume: 
Average Speed: 
Occupant Density: 
% of Capacity: 
7        1 
260    2 
35      3 
25%   4 
2.1    5 
1.32  6 
0.31  7 
 
B Flow volume: 
Average Speed: 
Occupant Density: 









C Flow volume: 
Average Speed: 
Occupant Density: 









D Flow volume: 
Average Speed: 
Occupant Density: 









E Flow volume: 
Average Speed: 
Occupant Density: 









F Flow volume: 
Average Speed: 
Occupant Density: 









Table 3.8 : Fruins Levels of Service 
Notes: 1. Units are pedestrians per foot width of corridor or stair per minute 
2. Speed in ft/min 
3. Density in sq.ft/person 
4. Flow at this level of service is given as a percentage of the maximum 
capacity of the corridor or stair. 
5. Metric units are pedestrians per metre width per minute 
6. Metric speeds in m/s 
7. Densities in occupants/m² 
The level of service typically assumed for egress routes is C, and will be used in this 
analysis. However, for higher density occupancies, such as crowd environments, this 
may be un-conservative. Therefore, working occupancies will be assumed to be level 
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of service C with a travel speed of 1.2 m/s, while bars and shops will have level of 
service E, and a travel speed of 0.8 m/s. 
The time to travel to the door, tt is calculated using Equation 3.13: 
tt = x / S 
           where x = the travel distance (m). 
Equation 3.13 
3.7 The Effect On Evacuation Time of the Number of People in the 
Space 
As noted in section 3.6, the travel speed is affected by the density of people on the 
egress routes, and hence will affect travel time. However, the size of the doors can 
also have a significant effect on the difference in egress time between the first and the 
last occupant. 
As the occupants will be generally assumed to be distributed fairly evenly throughout 
the space, the total time required to exit through the door will be taken as the greatest 
of the travel distance from the furthest corner of the room, tt, and the flow time 
through the door, tp. 
The flow time is calculated using similar assumption to those in the travel time 
calculations, based on work by Nelson & Maclennan (1995), giving the following 








where P = number of people 
D = density of people (persons/m²) 
a = 0.266 (a constant) 
k = 1.4 (a constant for horizontal travel) 
We = effective width of the door (m), being the clear width less 150 mm, but 
no 
less than 530 mm. 
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The maximum travel time for a group of people will be determined from the room 
size, and influenced by the level of service, and the time required for everyone to pass 
through the door to the space outside. To assess the total time required for a group of 
people to egress from a space, particularly where they are fairly evenly distributed 
throughout the space, the following assumptions can be made: 
•  If the time required to travel from the furthest occupied area to the door is greater 
than the time required for everyone to flow through the door, there will be no 
queue when the most distant occupant arrives, and they can pass straight through 
the door. The time required to egress is therefore the travel time. 
•  If the time required for everyone to pass through the door is greater than the time 
required for the most distant person to join the queue, then the egress time will be 
equal to the flow time. This assumes that the first person has not had to travel any 
distance to initiate the queue. If there is any initial travel distance for the first 
occupant before the queue can form, then the time associated with this travel 
distance should be included in the flow time. 
In this generic assessment, it will be assumed that there is no initial travel time, so the 
egress time is taken as the greatest of either the flow time or the travel time for the 
most distant occupant.  
As the evacuation time available is known, the arrangement of the egress route (being 
the travel distance and the route width) will determine the number of people able to 
escape in the time available. 
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4 RISK ASSESSMENT OF ESCAPE FROM FIRECELL 
OF FIRE ORIGIN 
4.1 t² Design Fires 
The following sections illustrate the trends observed in the analysis of the t² fires. 
These fires are standard fires, which are based on the assumption that the fire size is 
proportional to the square of the time after ignition. The rate of growth is also related 
to the time taken for the fire to reach an output of 1 MW. A fire with a slow growth 
rate reaches this size in 600 seconds, a medium growth rate in 300 seconds, fast in 
150 seconds, and ultra-fast in 75 seconds. The fire size relationship to time for these 















































4.1.1 Detection Times and Room Tenability 
A relationship between manual detection times, tenability times, and firecell size is 
expected due to these being affected by the volume available for smoke storage near 
the ceiling of the room. Automatic detector activation (including sprinklers) is not 
dependent on the room size as the correlations used assume an unconfined ceiling. 
Instead these times are dependent on the ceiling height and detector spacing. These 
relationships are illustrated in Figure 4.1, Figure 4.2, Figure 4.3, and Figure 4.4 for a 
medium fire growth rate. Figure 4.1 indicates that the assumption of a relationship 
between manual detection, tenability, and floor area of the firecell is significant. The 
relationship is closer to linear when the travel distance is substituted for the floor area 
in Figure 4.2. Note that the travel distance here is as defined in Section 3, being the 
sum of the length and breadth of the room, less 2 m.  While there is some spread, it 
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appears likely that this is due to the effect of the time-step used, in addition to some 
influence of the ceiling height. Figure 4.3 shows that the time-step used in the 
calculation of the automatic detector activation times is too large for the ceiling height 
effects to be observable here. The graph does, however, indicate the more significant 
difference in detector operation times for the different spacings. Where the spacings 
are reduced, detection times can be reduced by as much as 1 minute from those 
achieved by detectors at the maximum compliant spacing. Figure 4.4 shows that when 
sprinklers operate, the expectation of a dependence of tenability time on room area is 
confirmed. Refer to Section 3.3.1 for a definition of the sprinkler spacings and types 
included in each scenario. 
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Figure 4.1 : Manual Detection Times and Tenability vs Room Area for Medium 
Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.2 : Manual Detection Times and Tenability vs Travel Distance for 
Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.3 : Automatic Detector and Sprinkler Operation vs Ceiling Height for 
Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.4 : Tenability with Sprinkler Operation vs Room Area for Medium Fire 
Growth Rate 
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4.1.2 Potential for Radiation from the Fire to Obstruct the Escape Route 
The previous section addresses to the maximum time for which the firecell remains 
tenable, and its relationship to the room size. However, where the firecell is only 
provided with a single escape route, there is a risk that the fire may be in such a 
location that the radiation from the fire can prevent egress before tenable conditions 
are lost. Table 4.1 and Table 4.2 give the maximum fire sizes, and the times at which 
these sizes are reached for the various growth rates, that will permit egress when the 
fire is 1.0 m, 2.0 m, and 3.0 m from the escape route for the relevant travel speeds. 
The criteria here for successful egress (as described in Section 3.2.2), is that the skin 















1.0 m 536 kW 439 sec 219 sec 110 sec 55 sec 
2.0 m 1607 kW 760 sec 380 sec 190 sec 95 sec 
3.0 m 3069 kW 1051 sec 526 sec 263 sec 131 sec 
















1.0 m 295 kW 326 sec 163 sec 81 sec 41 sec 
2.0 m 1031 kW 609 sec 305 sec 152 sec 76 sec 
3.0 m 2173 kW 887 sec 442 sec 221 sec 111 sec 
Table 4.2 : Radiation and Separation - 0.8 m/s Travel Speed in Crowd 
Environment 
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The effect of these constrictions of the tenability time are shown in Figure 4.5, Figure 
4.6, Figure 4.7, and Figure 4.8 for the different fire growth rates. 
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Figure 4.5 : Tenability Time for Slow Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.6 : Tenability Time for Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 89
 
Figure 4.7 : Tenability Time for Fast Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.8 : Tenability Time for Ultra-Fast Fire Growth Rate 
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However, as well as the effect, the probability of a fire being in a location where it 
might affect egress should also be considered. In the following assessment, it is 
assumed that there are several possible routes through the firecell to the single escape 
route. Therefore, radiation from the fire will only restrict egress if it is located 
adjacent to this final exit point, as indicated in Figure 4.9. The size of the fire that 
might obstruct occupants is taken as the size of the fire when tenability in the firecell 
is lost, and the separation required between the exit route and a fire of that size is 
calculated using the trend-line equations determined in Figure 3.1. 
Conservatively, the separation required is the separation between the escape route and 
the edge of the item. The calculation method (assuming a spherical heat flux 
distribution pattern), is based on radiation from the centre of the fire, but may not be 
totally accurate at close distances. Although crude, it is still considered sufficiently 







Figure 4.9 : Fire Obstruction Criteria 
To illustrate the situation, consider a medium growth rate fire in the firecell. At the 
time that tenability is reached, the fire will have reached a certain size. The radiation 
from a fire this size will prevent occupants passing within a separation distance, y of 
the edge of the item on fire. Therefore, the critical fire location area (indicated in the 
figure above) can be determined for each fire scenario, and the ratio of this area to the 
remainder of the firecell is defined here as the probability of the fire obstructing 





x = 1 m egress width + 2 * Separation Distance 








A further modification is also made to this probability of obstruction, in which the 
probability of a fire occurring per square metre is no greater in a small firecell than in 
a large firecell. This is referred to here as the normalised probability of obstruction. 
This is calculated as shown in Equation 4.3, where Amax is the area of the largest 













These probabilities are graphed in Figure 4.10 and Figure 4.11. In Figure 4.10, it can 
be seen that where the probability is not normalised, the probability of obstruction 
increases in an exponential fashion as the firecell size reduces. This is due to the small 
area of the firecell in relation to the area where a fire might obstruct egress. When the 
probability is normalised, the probability of fire occurring in a small firecell is less 
due to the lesser area of the firecell. In a small firecell, where tenability conditions are 
lost earlier (due to the small smoke storage volume), the fire size at loss of tenability 
is smaller, and hence the influence of radiation from the fire is smaller. This then 
explains the reduction in normalised probability of a fire controlling egress from 
smaller firecells.  
In the situations where sprinklers are provided, note that the normalised probability is 
significantly less than when sprinklers are not installed (typically 0.3% in comparison 
to 1-2% when sprinklers not provided). This is due to the sprinkler operation 
controlling the fire size, and reducing the critical area. The size of the fire is 
dependent on the time at which the sprinkler operates which is independent of the 
room size hence there is no reduction in the normalised probability in small firecells. 
Instead of separations of up to 3 m or more being required, the sprinkler operation 
controls the fire size such that the separation required is typically less than 1.5 m for 
medium fire growth rate. When the fire growth rate is faster, the fire tends to be larger 
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and the separation increases. A fast fire still typically needs a separation of 1.6 m, and 
an ultra-fast fire requires an average separation of just over 2 m. 
Note that the probabilities discussed above and illustrated in the graphs are not real 
probabilities, and do not reflect the actual probability of a fire in such a location. The 
values are of use in a relative sense only. 
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Figure 4.10 : Probability of Obstruction - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.11 : Probability of Obstruction - Sprinkler Controlled Fire, Medium 
Fire Growth Rate 
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4.1.3 Time Available to React and Escape after Detection 
As noted previously, tenability and manual detection times have a reasonably strong 
dependence on the firecell size, and on the longest travel distance to the final escape 
route from the firecell. Although automatic detectors do not have this relationship, the 
time available to escape after detection still retains the general dependence due to the 
tenability time as indicated in Figure 4.12, Figure 4.13, Figure 4.14, and Figure 4.15 
for the various fire growth rates. 
In these figures, the following trends can be seen: 
•  As the firecell size increases, the time available after manual detection for egress 
past fires close to the escape route decreases. This reflects the dependence of 
manual detection on the thickness of the smoke layer, which is in turn dependent 
on the firecell size. 
•  Available time after automatic detector operation is typically fairly constant where 
radiation may control egress. This is because neither the detection nor the 
radiation from the fire are related to the firecell size. 
•  The available time after automatic detector operation increases with firecell size 
where only tenability of the firecell affects the success of egress. Although the 
detector operation is not dependent on firecell size, the tenability time is related to 
it, hence the continuing relationship. 
•  In smaller firecells, detection often occurs after tenability is lost, particularly 
where the maximum travel distance is less than 20 m. 
The next step is to assess the impact of the varying pre-movement times associated 
with the different occupancies on the time remaining for egress movement. Firstly, 
Table 4.3 gives the pre-movement times used in this analysis. It is apparent on 
inspection that these will not leave any travel time for egress in many situations, 
particularly where the fire growth rate is faster than a medium fire. Further, this seems 
to show that detection may occur even after loss of tenability, particularly in small 














Avg Max Min Avg Max Min Avg Max Min 
Office 86 135 39 71 111 32 109 171 50 
Retail 107 138 49 80 126 36 160 251 73 
Bar 130 204 59 92 145 42 218 343 99 
Table 4.3 : Pre-Movement Times 
 98
 
Figure 4.12 : Available Evacuation Time – Slow Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.13 : Available Evacuation Time – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.14 : Available Evacuation Time – Fast Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.15 : Available Evacuation Time – Ultra-Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 102
4.1.4 Time Available for Escape 
In the following sections, the effect of different fire growth rates and responses by the 
occupants in different occupancies on the successful rate of evacuation is to be 
assessed. Firstly, a medium fire growth rate will be evaluated for each occupancy, 
then the effects of different fire growth rates on those results will be investigated. An 
adequate or satisfactory success rate is defined here as when the evacuation outcome 
success rate exceeds 90% for that scenario. 
Work Environment - Office 
Given the clear relationship between travel distance and time between detection and 
tenability for most, if not all detection methods, it is reasonable to assume that this 
relationship will continue to apply to the time available for escape (ie after pre-
movement activities have been undertaken). This is shown in Figure 4.16, including a 
line giving the required escape time to cover the travel distance at 1.2 m/s. 
To aid the evaluation of the office evacuation scenarios, refer to Figure 4.17 showing 
the number of scenarios with successful and unsuccessful evacuations.  
When reviewing the scenario comparison graphs, note that all are similarly arranged. 
The sequence of bars from left to right first shows the scenarios where the fire is 1 m 
from the escape route. The second series gives the results for a 2 m separation, the 
third series, a 3 m separation, and the fourth series gives the results where the fire is 
remote from the escape route. 
These figures give the percentage of successful outcomes, being those points above 
the line showing required egress time  for Figure 4.17 this is from Figure 4.16. From 
this, an assessment of the effectiveness of the various detection methods can be made. 
The following comments relate to this graph. 
In small firecells (with travel distance of less than 10 m), evacuation is generally 
predicted to be unsuccessful due to the small smoke storage volume. However, this is 
not considered totally reasonable as the scenarios include a pre-movement time of 
between 40 and 132 seconds. In a small firecell, occupants will tend to be in close 
proximity to the fire, and hence more aware of cues other than smoke. The travel 
distances and hence travel times are also relatively small. In such a situation it does 
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not seem reasonable for manual detection, or even pre-movement activities to 
continue after tenability is lost, and it is most likely that these occupants would 
quickly recognise the situation, and the danger from the smoke. However, it should 
also be noted that the travel time assumed in these analyses does not include flow time 
through doors (this being more dependent on the number of people). Where this time 
is long in comparison to the travel time to reach the doors, it would be reasonable to 
assume that this time is incorporated in the pre-movement time, which might 
otherwise be shorter than predicted due to greater occupant awareness of the fire. 
In slightly larger firecells, where the travel distance for egress is between 10 and 
20 m, manual detection consistently occurs before automatic detectors operate. 
Although a reasonable proportion of outcomes dependent on manual detection do not 
have sufficient time for egress, few of those dependent on automatic detection are 
successful. 
As the firecell size increases, manual detection times increase, although automatic 
detection times do not. While smoke detectors give increasingly earlier warning than 
manual detection (resulting in the greatest number of successful escape outcomes), 
heat detectors do not out-perform the occupants as detectors until the firecell size is 
such that the travel distances exceed 60 m. 
As could be implied from Figure 4.17, there is little difference in the success rate of 
evacuation once the separation between the fire and the escape route exceeds 2 m.  In 
the largest firecells where the travel distance is greater than 60 m, manual detection 
tends to be inadequate to permit egress within 2 m of the fire. A separation of 1 m 
usually results in failure, although there are a small number of successful outcomes 
occurring when the travel distance is less than 30 m, and either occupant detection or 
smoke detection provides the warning. 
Next, look at the variation between the scenarios for the different detection methods. 
These are shown in Figure 4.18, Figure 4.19, and Figure 4.20. 
The different manual detection scenarios are dependent on the alertness of the 
occupants, and not readily prescribable (unlike automatic detectors where the 
response and spacing determine the detection response time), these scenarios illustrate 
the range of possible successful evacuations. As noted before, there appears to be little 
 104
chance of success in small firecells, but this is not considered realistic for the reasons 
given above. In larger firecells, the success rate improves with travel distance, and it 
appears that the distance of the fire from the escape route has little effect on the 
success rate. However, where the fire is 1 m or closer , there is little chance of 
success. Where the occupants are not particularly observant, manual detection is 
typically inadequate. However, in the cases where they are more observant, reacting at 
the average time, more outcomes are successful than unsuccessful. 
The different heat detection scenarios have been created (as noted in Section 3), by 
changing the spacing of the detectors. Figure 4.19 shows that this has a significant 
effect on the success rate of the evacuations. All spacings are compliant with the 
requirements of NZS 4512, and the spacing scenario illustrated in Figure 4.17 is the 
largest spacing, ie Scenario 5.  It can be seen that the separation of the fire from the 
escape route has little effect on the success rate provided it is greater than 1 m, even 
over long travel distances. Successful evacuation is therefore typically controlled by 
the tenability of the firecell rather than radiation to the escape route. 
As with the heat detection scenarios, the smoke detection scenarios are also for 
different detector spacings, and Figure 4.20 indicates that these too have a significant 
effect on the chance of a successful evacuation. A comparison of Figure 4.19 and 
Figure 4.20 indicates that scenario 1 of the heat detectors (2 m spacing) is similar in 
success to scenario 5 of the smoke detectors (10 m spacing). The similarity in 
activation times is also apparent in Figure 4.3. Successful egress is usually possible 
where the travel distance is greater than 30 m and the fire is 2 m or more from the 
escape route. 
Finally, consider the effect of sprinklers. In Figure 4.21, the available escape time 
from a sprinklered office is shown. Manual detection, detection by sprinkler 
activation, and detection by smoke detector activation is considered. Note that the 
required separation of the fire from the egress route is not included in the assessment 
as it is usually less than 1.5 m.  The graph indicates that the available escape time 
usually exceeds the required escape time in most situations, although in smaller 
firecells, tenability time still tends to be too short. Figure 4.22 confirms this, but also 
indicates that in these situations, manual detection and, where provided, smoke 
detection, is most likely to provide adequate alert. The benefits of smoke detection are 
 105
most apparent in the larger firecells, ie travel distance of 40 m or more. The least 
satisfactory situation is when the alarm is given only by sprinkler operation. However, 
successful evacuation from the firecell is only relevant when people are present, and it 




Figure 4.16 : Escape Time from Work Environment – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.17 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.18 : Work Environment Manual Detection Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.19 : Work Environment Escape Heat Detection Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.20 : Work Environment Escape Smoke Detection Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.21 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.22 : Work Environment Escape Sprinkler Protection Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Graphs describing the results for all of the t² fire scenarios analysed are given in the 
appendices in Section 11. When these other fire growth rates are considered, the 
following trends can be seen: 
General Comparison of Detection Methods 
•  Where the fire growth rate is slow and the firecell size is small, manual detection 
is predicted early enough to allow some successful egress outcomes. 
•  As the fire growth rate increases, smoke detection tends to provide increasingly 
earlier warning times than manual detection, and hence a greater rate of successful 
egress outcomes. This particularly applies to medium to large size firecells where 
the travel distance exceeds 30 m. 
•  When the fire growth rate is slow, manual and smoke detection typically occur 
early enough to permit egress within 1 m of the fire, although as the travel 
distance increases beyond 60 m, a 2 m separation is required. 
•  When the fire growth rate is fast, a 3 m separation is typically required, but this is 
not always adequate if tenability is lost first. 
•  Where the fire growth rate is ultra-fast, few if any successful egress outcomes 
are predicted, and when they occur, are usually in response to smoke detector 
activation. 
Manual Detection 
•  There continues to be a wide range of success rates for the different manual 
detection scenarios, and for a slow growing fire, average detection times are 
usually adequate to permit egress, even within 1 m of the fire. 
•  There are few successful outcomes once the fire growth rate is fast or ultra-
fast. 
Heat Detection 
•  The spacing of the heat detectors continues to have a significant influence on the 
success rate. 
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•  In small firecells, if heat detectors are provided at the closer spacings, adequate 
warning may be provided to egress past a fire no closer than 2 m to an escape 
route. 
•  As the firecell size increases, the effectiveness of the heat detector operation 
generally improves, and is most appropriate when the travel distance is 50 m or 
greater. 
•  If the fire has a slow growth rate the radiation is unlikely to obstruct egress when 
the fire is within 1 m of the escape route, and the travel distance is 50 m or less. 
For longer travel distances a 2 m separation is needed. 
•  Where the fire growth rate is fast, a 1 m separation is typically required, 
increasing to 2 m when the travel distance exceeds 40 m. 
•  Where the fire growth rate is ultra-fast, there are few successful escape outcomes. 
Smoke Detection 
•  At a slow fire growth rate, smoke detectors are typically able to provide sufficient 
warning for egress past a fire within 1 m of the escape route.  
•  At faster fire growth rates, radiation will obstruct egress if the fire is within 1 m of 
the escape route, but not at any greater separation. 
•  As the fire growth rate speed increases, the spacing of the smoke detectors has less 
of an effect on the success rate. Where the fire has a fast growth rate, there is 
virtually 100% success where travel distances exceed 50 m, provided the fire is no 
closer than 3 m from the escape route. 
•  Where the fire growth rate is ultra-fast, the success rate is low, and typically 
controlled by radiation as well as tenability. 
Sprinkler Protection 
•  Notification by sprinkler activation continues to be typically inadequate, except in 
large firecells, where the travel distance exceeds 60 m. 
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•  In smaller firecells, particularly where the fire growth rate is slower, manual 
detection is most effective, however as the fire growth rate increases, smoke 
detection improves relative to manual detection, particularly where the travel 
distance exceeds 30-40 m. 
•  The firecell typically needs to be large to maintain tenability during egress, even 
when the fire is controlled by the sprinklers. Egress is most likely to be successful 
where the travel distance exceeds 50 m where dependent on manual detection, or 
30 m where smoke detection is provided. 
Mobile Crowd Occupancy - Retail 
The differences between the analyses for office and retail occupancies are the pre-
movement times and the egress travel speeds. 
Firstly, consider the time available for escape, after detection and pre-movement as 
shown in Figure 4.23. This is similar to Figure 4.16, as might be expected due to the 
relatively small difference between the pre-movement times for office and retail 
occupancies, and the different angle of the line due to the slower travel speed. The 
resulting reduction of the number of successful escape outcomes can be more clearly 
seen in Figure 4.24. Where the escape route is less than 30 m, manual and smoke 
detection is occasionally successful, while heat detection is not. As the travel 
distances increase, smoke detection, and then heat detection occurs sufficiently early 
to allow some successful results. Once the separation distance of the fire from the 
escape route is 3 m or more, radiation has little influence on the success rate except 
when the travel distance exceeds 70 m, and manual detection provides the alert. 
When the different scenarios of manual, heat, and smoke detection are reviewed (refer 
Appendices, Section 11 for details), similar trends to those indicated for the office 
occupancy may be seen, but generally with less success. As might be expected, there 
is a more pronounced trend for radiation from the fire to tend to prevent egress, due to 
the longer time it takes for the occupants to reach the door (slower travel speed, and 
longer pre-movement times).  
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For manual detection, where the travel detection exceeds 30 m, the critical separation 
distance is 2 m, increasing to 3 m where the travel distance exceeds 50 m, and more 
after 70 m. 
Heat detection tends only to provide adequate notification when the travel distance 
exceeds 60 m. With closer spaced detectors, this could be reduced to 40 m.  As above, 
the critical separation distance is influenced by the travel distance, and is typically 2 
m, but where the travel distance exceeds 70 m, the critical separation distance is 3 m. 
Smoke detectors tend to operate at an earlier time than heat detectors, and in this case 
generally provide adequate warning when the travel distance is no less than 40 m. 
This warning, however, is not adequate to permit egress within 1 m of the fire. At 
longer travel distances (70 m or more), if the fire is within 2 m of the escape route, 
radiation may still prevent egress. 
The installation of sprinklers, as expected, increases the number of successful 
outcomes (refer to Figure 4.25). There is little difference between these successful 
egress rate for retail from that seen in an office environment other than a reduction in 
the success rate for smaller firecells (where the travel distance is less than 40 m). 
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Figure 4.24 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Figure 4.25 : Available Escape Time from Mobile Crowd Environment with 
Sprinkler Protection – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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When the effects of different fire growth rates are reviewed (in the Appendices, 
Section 11), the following trends may be noticed. 
General Detection Method Comparison 
•  As with the office type occupancy, a small number of successful egress outcomes 
are predicted from the smallest firecells when the fire has a slow growth rate and 
the fire is manually detected. 
•  Once the travel distance exceeds 40 m, and the fire growth rate is slow, a 2 m 
separation is required. At shorter travel distances radiation does not hinder egress. 
•  At faster fire growth rates, manual detection is typically inadequate. Smoke 
detection often provides adequate warning in the larger firecells, where the travel 
distance exceeds 60 m. Heat detection is sometimes able to provide adequate 
warning, but typically is not early enough. 
•  A 3 m or greater separation is typically required when the fire growth rate is fast. 
•  Where the fire has an ultra-fast growth rate, there are no outcomes with successful 
egress (not illustrated). 
Manual Detection Scenarios 
•  Manual detection is reasonably adequate in larger firecells when the fire has a 
slow growth rate. 
•  When the travel distance exceeds 30 m, radiation from the fire can affect egress 
when within 2 m of the escape route. The critical distance increases to 3 m when 
the travel distance exceeds 80 m. 
•  There are few successful outcomes when the fire growth rate is fast or ultra-fast. 
Heat Detection 
•  Where the fire growth rate is slow and the travel distance is less than 40 m, there 
are few successful outcomes. If the heat detector spacing is the maximum 
compliant spacing (ie scenario 5), then a 60 m travel distance is required. 
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Radiation from the fire can prevent egress when the fire is within 2 m of the 
escape route, and as the heat detector spacing increases, radiation from fires up to 
3 m from the escape route may affect egress when travel distances exceed 70 m. 
•  Where the fire growth rate is fast, radiation from the fire will affect egress if it is 
within 3 m of the escape route, particularly where the travel distance exceeds 50 
m. However, even in the large firecells, tenability tends to be critical and there are 
few successful outcomes. 
•  When the fire growth rate is ultra-fast, there are no successful outcomes (not 
illustrated) 
Smoke Detection 
•  Where the fire growth rate is slow and the travel distance is less than 40 m, 
radiation does not affect egress, even at a 1 m separation of the fire from the 
escape route. At greater travel distances, the critical separation becomes 2 m. 
•  When the fire growth rate is fast, and the fire is 3 m from the escape route, 
radiation starts controlling egress when the travel distance exceeds 50 m. 
•  In smaller firecells (travel distance less than 60 m), tenability is the primary cause 
of failure in most outcomes. 
Sprinkler Protection 
•  Where sprinklers are provided and the fire growth rate is slow, manual alert 
provides a reasonable success rate. The success rate generally becomes acceptable 
only in larger firecells where the travel distance exceeds 60 m. 
•  When the fire growth rate is fast the firecell size still needs to be such that the 
travel distance exceeds 60 m. 
•  Smoke detection is more effective than manual detection where the travel 
distances are shorter and the fire growth rate is faster for providing adequate 
warning. 
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Seated Crowd Occupancy - Bar 
Similar trends noted in the retail occupancy continue in the bar occupancy. While the 
travel speed remains at 0.8 m/s, the pre-movement time is further increased. The time 
available is illustrated in Figure 4.26. The increase in pre-movement times is such that 
there is a general reduction in the occurrence of successful outcomes. 
As for the other occupancies, the outcomes for small firecells are typically 
unsuccessful. The firecell size needs to be such that the travel distance is 40 m or 
greater before some successful outcomes are seen. These outcomes are usually 
dependent on smoke detector activation, and also indicate that radiation from a fire 
within 2-3 m of the escape route may hinder egress. 
Manual detection is typically inadequate, even in the larger firecells. Some successful 
outcomes are predicted, but the success rate is not sufficient for this to be considered 
generally acceptable. 
When the travel distance is less than 40 m, and heat detection is provided, a 1 m 
separation is typically adequate, however, when the travel distance exceeds 50 m, 
radiation from a fire with a 2 m separation will tend to hinder egress, making the 
critical separation distance 3 m.  Even at this separation, egress in response to more 
widely spaced heat detectors from a firecell with a 90 m travel distance could be 
hindered by radiation. 
Similar to the trend noted in the effect of radiation from the fire, the warning from 
smoke detectors is typically sufficiently early that radiation is unlikely to impede 
egress if the fire is within 2 m of the escape route and the travel distance is no greater 
than 50 m.  At longer travel distances, the required separation increases to 3 m.  
However, the earlier warning of the smoke detectors does improve the available 
tenability time, and giving a high success rate where the travel distance exceeds 70 m.  
In contrast, where heat detectors are provided, a similar success rate is not achieved 
below an 80 m travel distance. 
Finally, assessing the effects of sprinkler control (refer to Figure 4.27), the delay 
caused by pre-movement time significantly reduces the available escape time before 
tenability is lost. While a travel distance of 50 m still provides adequate tenability 
time to egress in most cases, the number of successful outcomes from smaller firecells 
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is significantly reduced from those observed earlier in office and retail situations. As 
noted previously in the retail situation, smoke detection is increasingly beneficial, and 
tending to occur before manual detection in the larger firecells. 
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Figure 4.27 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Seated Crowd 
Environment – Medium Fire Growth Rate 
When other fire growth rates are considered the following trends can be seen: 
General comparison of Detection Methods 
•  Where the fire growth rate is slow, manual detection occurs before automatic 
detection, particularly in smaller firecells (travel distance less than 50 m) 
•  Where the growth rate is slow, there is little obstruction due to radiation when the 
fire is close to the escape route. Only when the travel distance exceeds 40 m is a 2 
m separation required. 
•  Where the fire growth rate is fast, there are few successful outcomes. Those that 
are successful result from smoke detector activation, and the fire being further 
than 3 m from the escape route. 
•  There are no successful outcomes when the fire growth rate is ultra-fast. 
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Manual Detection Scenarios 
•  Manual detection is typically adequate when the fire growth rate is slow and the 
travel distance exceeds 40 m, however at these distances a 2 m or greater 
separation between the fire and the escape route is required. 
•  When the fire growth rate is fast or ultra fast, there are no successful outcomes. 
Heat Detection Scenarios 
•  Where the fire growth rate is slow, a 2 m separation is typically required to 
prevent radiation hindering egress. 
•  The firecell size needs to be relatively large (travel distance exceeding 60 m) for 
the outcomes to be typically successful. 
•  Where the fire growth rate is fast, radiation from the fire will hinder egress if 
within 3 m of the escape route. Otherwise, tenability is generally critical, with 
successful outcomes generally occurring only when the detectors are installed at 
closer spacings. 
Smoke Detection Scenarios 
•  As noted in the heat detection scenarios (also for a slow fire growth rate), a 2 m 
separation is typically required between the fire and the escape route to prevent 
excessive radiation. 
•  Where travel distances exceed 50 m, the outcome is typically successful. 
•  For fast fire growth rates, as for the heat detection scenario, radiation will 
generally hinder egress if the fire is within 3 m of the escape route. Where the 
travel distance exceeds 60 m, there is a reasonable chance of a successful outcome 
provided radiation does not hinder escape. 
Sprinkler Protection 
•  If the fire growth rate is slow, manual detection will typically occur before smoke 
detection, but if it is fast, smoke detection will precede manual detection. 
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•  During a slow fire, a reasonable success rate is reached when the travel distance 
exceeds 60 m, but in a fast, and even an ultra-fast fire, a similar success rate is not 
reached where the travel distance is less than 70 m. 
4.1.5 Summary of t² Fire Analyses 
The trends and comments made in the preceding sections are summarised in Table 
4.4, and the following comments are provided to repeat the more important results: 
•  As this study is primarily addressing firecells with only single means of escape, 
the situation where two escape routes from the firecell are provided, with a shorter 
dead end escape route to reach the alternative route, has not been addressed. 
However, these results could also be applied to that situation. The effect of 
radiation from the fire could also be used to assess the separation required 
between different escape routes, or to aid in the positioning of a critical item, 
ensuring it is sufficiently distant from an escape route. 
•  The manual detection time is calculated based on a smoke layer thickness. The 
model includes no improvements for when occupants may be in close proximity 
and hence receive other cues. This, while conservative for large firecells (where 
the most distance occupants have an equal opportunity to detect the fire), this may 
be unreasonably slow for small firecells where the occupants will all be in closer 
proximity to the fire. 
•  The pre-movement times calculated are typically not related to the conditions at 
detection, with the exception of the various manual detection scenarios. Therefore, 
in smaller firecells, where smoke from the fire is likely to alarm occupants earlier, 
and reduce the time taken for pre-movement activities, these times are very 
conservative. 
•  The available evacuation time is typically dependent on the plan area of the 
firecell, with relatively little dependence on the ceiling height. 
•  Manual detection is frequently predicted to occur before smoke detection, 
particularly in smaller firecells, and in almost all cases it will precede heat 
detection. 
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•  The risk of a fire obstructing an egress route is typically very low. The risks 
calculated earlier assume that the route may be blocked at a single point, and will 
be relatively higher if the arrangement of the escape routes has several such 
control points. 
•  The separation required between the fire and the escape route is mainly dependent 
on the fire growth rate. The travel time to reach the fire has relatively little 
influence on its size, particularly as the greatest proportion of the time required to 
evacuated the firecell is in the pre-movement times. 
•  Sprinkler operation typically controls the fire to a size that permits egress within 
approximately 1.5 m of the fire. Therefore, radiation is unlikely to affect egress. 
The primary reason for egress failure is therefore the tenability time. For the same 
reasons as noted above, the unsuccessful outcomes in small firecells are not 
considered to be realistic. The threat of the fire, including other cues from the 
proximity of the fire are likely to result in reduced detection and pre-movement 




Slow Fire Growth Rate Medium Fire Growth 
Rate 
Fast Fire Growth Rate Ultra-Fast Fire 
Growth Rate 
Manual 1 m separation adequate up 
to 60 m travel distance, then 
need 2 m separation. Good 
success rate where travel 
distance > 30 m. Some 
success in small firecells. 
2 m separation required, 
increasing to 3 m where 
travel distance exceeds 
70 m. Most successful 
where travel distance > 
60 m. 
Few successful outcomes, 
generally controlled by tenability 
rather than radiation. 
No successful 
outcomes. 
Heat 1 m separation adequate up 
to 50 m travel distance, then 
need 2 m separation. Good 
success rate when travel 
distance > 60 m. Closer 
detector spacings could 
reduce this by 10-20 m. 
2 m separation required 
for all travel distances. 
Most successful where 
travel distance > 60 m. 
Closer spacings would 
permit reducing this by 
10-20 m. 
2 m separation up to 40 m travel 
distance, but further than this, 
require 3 m separation. When 
travel distance exceeds 60 m, 
radiation at 3 m may still affect. 
Most successful at 60 m travel 
distance, but could reduce this by 
10 m if spacings reduced. 
Few successful 
outcomes, none 
when separation < 
3 m. 
Office 
Smoke 1 m separation adequate for 
all firecell sizes. Best 
success rate when travel 
distance > 40 m. 
2 m separation required. 
Adequately successful 
(~90%) when travel 
distance > 40 m. 
2 m separation required for travel 
distances < 50 m. Above this, 
require 3 m separation. Most 




when separation < 
3 m. 
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Sprinklers A few successful outcomes 
in small firecells. Manual 
detection best when travel 
distance < 50 m, then smoke 
detection improves. When 
manual detection, best 
success at 60 m + travel 
distances, or 40 m + when 
smoke detection. 
Manual and smoke 
detection similar, but 
smoke better once travel 
distance > 30 m. 
Acceptable success rate 
for smoke detectors 
where travel distance > 
40 m, 60 m for both 
manual and sprinkler 
alert. 
Smaller firecells typically 
unsuccessful. Smoke detection 
typically gives earlier warning 
than manual detection. Smoke 
detector warning mostly 
successful then travel distance > 
50 m, manual detection is 
successful when travel distance > 
60 m. 
Smaller firecells 
lose tenability too 
fast. When travel 
distance > 60 m, 




Manual 1 m separation adequate up 
to 40 m travel distance, then 
2 m is adequate up to 80 m. 
3 m separation required for 
90 m travel distance. 
Reasonable success rates 
when travel distance 50 m 
and greater. 
Few successful outcomes 
 only 50% success rate 
at best (or average) 
detection where travel 
distance > 50 m. 2 m 
separation required up to 
40 m travel distance, 3 m 
up to 70 m, > 3 m 
required for larger 
firecells. 
No successful outcomes No successful 
outcomes. 
Retail 
Heat 2 m separation adequate for 
most travel distances, but 
some interference when 
travel distances > 80 m. 
Reasonable success when 
travel distance > 60 m. 
Best success rates when 
travel distance > 60 m. 2 
m separation does not 
obstruct egress when 
travel distance less than 
50 m, but 3 m separation 
needed in bigger 
firecells. 
Radiation typically hinders if fire 
within 3 m of the escape route. 
Tenability times generally 
inadequate when travel distance 
less than 90 m, although close 
spacing of heat detectors would 
give acceptable warning for 60 m 




Smoke 1 m separation adequate up 
to 30 m travel distance, but 
above that, 2 m separation 
required. Acceptable 
success rates reached when 
travel distance > 50 m. 
Best success rates then 
travel distance greater 
than 50 m. 2 m 
separation will not hinder 
egress for most travel 
distances, but 3 m 
separation best for travel 




3 m separation required up to 50 
m travel distance, then greater 
separation required for longer 
travel distances. Adequate 
warning provided for firecells 
with travel distance > 60 m. 
No successful 
outcomes. 
Sprinklers Manual detection earlier 
than smoke detection when 
travel distance less than 40 
m. Acceptable success rates 
reached when travel 
distance > 50 m (smoke) 
and 60 m (manual) 
detection. 
Smoke detector typically 
provides earlier warning, 
and best success when 
travel distance > 50 m. If 
no smoke detection, need 
to > 60 m. 
Smoke detection precedes manual 
detection. Acceptable egress 
success when travel distance > 60 







distance > 70 m. 
Manual A 2 m separation is required 
where travel distance 
exceeds 40 m. Up to that 
size, 1 m generally 
adequate. 
Few successful scenarios, 
generally where the fire 
is not within 3 m of the 
escape route. 
No successful outcomes. No successful 
outcomes. 
Bar 
Heat A 2 m separation is 
typically adequate. 
Acceptable success rate 
occurs when travel distance 
greater than 60 m. 
A separation of 3 m is 
typically required. 
Acceptable levels of 
successful outcomes do 
not occur below travel 
distances of 60 m. 
Few successful outcomes  
separation required to be greater 
than 3 m. Some chance of success 
when travel distance > 50 m, but 




Smoke A 2 m separation is 
typically adequate. 
Acceptable success rate 
where travel distance 
greater than 50 m. 
A 2 m separation is 
adequate for smaller 
firecells, but 3 m is 
required where the travel 
distance is greater than 
50 m. Successful 
outcomes, assuming 
separation provided, 
occur when travel 
distance it 60 m or 
greater. 
3 m separation will not hinder 
when travel distance less than 40 
m. When travel distance is 50 60 
m, there is 50% chance of 




Sprinklers Manual detection earlier 
than smoke detection when 
travel distance less than 30 
m. Acceptable success rates 
reached when travel 
distance > 60 m (smoke) 
and 70 m (manual) 
detection. 
Smoke detection 
typically occurs before 
manual detection. Travel 
distances of 60 m 
(smoke) and 70 m 
(manual) are required for 
acceptable egress success 
rates. 
Smoke detection typically occurs 
earlier than manual detection. 
Acceptable success routes reached 
when travel distance > 60 m 








travel distance > 
70 m for both. 
Table 4.4 : Summary of Analysis Results
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4.2 Item Fires 
As noted in Section 3, a number of specific item fires will be considered in this 
assessment. These have been taken from Särdqvist (1993) as well as from the NIST 
web-site, and are summarised in Table 4.5. Those marked with an asterix (*) have 
been analysed more fully in the following section. The heat release rates for these 
fires are given in the following figures (as referenced in the Table). These item fires 
have been selected as the heat release rate graphs indicate that these items have the 








 Y0/20 Room furnished with an office module. The partitions 
were forming a U, with a desk on one side and a file 
cabinet on the other. As fire failed to develop, these 
particular results will not be used. 
 * Y0/21 Similar to Y0/20, with rearrangement of papers on the 
desk 
 * Y0/22 Computer work station with a computer desk and a 
bookcase at right angles to each other. 
Computer desk: The desk had a set of 4 shelves above 
and a small cabinet under the top. 
Free burning 
  Y0/23 Same as Y0/22, but in a room 
Wardrobes 
Figure 4.29 
 Y3.1/10 Simulated clothing: Four different fabrics placed into 
the wardrobes on 16 clothes hangers. 
Steel wardrobe, painted 
  Y3.1/11 Clothes as above (typical) 
Plywood wardrobe 
  Y3.1/12 Particleboard wardrobe with drawers and shelves 
 * Y3.1/13 Plywood wardrobe with rolling door  unfinished 
  Y3.1/14 Plywood wardrobe with rolling door  FR Latex paint 
on inside 
  Y3.1/15 Plywood wardrobe with rolling door - 2 coats FR latex 




 Y3.3/11 Bookcases, containing X-ray records 
Paper envelopes containing paper and plastic X-ray 
plates. 
  Y3.3/12 Open shelving unit with paper. Distance between units 
0.7 m. Four open shelving units, each with 5 steel 
shelves. Bottom shelves (1 & 2) contain 37 kg 
horizontally stacked paper.  
Shelves 3 & 4 : 14 kg paper in open top vertical file 
holders 
Shelf 5 : 19 kg paper in closed cardboard boxes. 
 * Y3.3/13 Open shelving units with paper as described above. 
Two boxes with paper products were placed in the 
aisle between the units. Total mass: 3 kg. Distance 




 Y5.0/10 Stackable plastic chairs. Neither padding nor cushions. 
Seat and back: Polypropene (one piece) 
Legs : Metal. 
Single Chair 
  Y5.0/11 5 chairs in one row, middle chair ignited 
  Y5.0/12 8 chairs in four rows, chair in second row ignited 
  Y5.0/13 6 chairs in one stack, top chair ignited 
 * Y5.0/14 12 chairs in 2 stacks, top chair ignited 
  Y5.0/15 Metal framed chairs containing approx 0.5 kg PU foam 
and 2kg celluslosic materials 
Single Chair 
  Y5.0/16 4 chairs in 1 stack 
  Y5.0/17 8 chairs in one stack 




* Y5.3/10 Wooden frame, polyurethane foam, polyolefin fabric 
Size and mass: 0.84 x 0.84 x 0.81 m³, 28.34kg 
  Y5.3/11 Frame: One-piece moulded polystyrene with plywood 
inserts. Polyurethane foam, polyolefin fabric cover.  
Size and mass: 0.84 x 0.84 x 0.81 m³, 11.52kg 
  Y5.3/12 Wooden frame, polyurethane foam, cotton fabric, 0.91 
x 0.91 x 0.81 m³, 15.68kg 
  Y5.3/13 Wood reinforced polyurethane foam, metal springs 
with 25-50 mm polyester batting, polyurethane foam 
imitation leather cover. 0.84 x 0.84 x 0.76 m³, 15.98kg. 
  Y5.3/14 Wooden frame, polyurethane foam, polyester filled 





* Y5.4/21 3-seat sofa, wooden frame, polyurethane foam filling, 
polyolefin fabric cover, 0.84 x 2.0 x 0.81 m³, 51.5 kg. 
  Y5.4/22 Loveseat, metal frame, polyurethane foam covered 
with a layer of cotton, plastic coated fabric cover, 0.84 
x 1.32 x 0.72 m³, 27.3 kg 
  Y5.4/23 Loveseat. Oak wood frame, polyurethane foam with 
cotton layer, plastic coated fabric cover, end panels of 
9.5 mm plywood with polyurethane padding and 
plastic coated fabric cover, 0.81 x 1.37 x 0.76 m³ 
cover, 54.6 kg. 
NIST Tests * Figure 4.34, 
Figure 4.35 
Small Dresser 
 * Figure 4.36, 
Figure 4.37 
3-panel workstation 
 * Figure 4.38, 
Figure 4.39 
2-panel workstation 
 * Figure 4.40, 
Figure 4.41 
Sofa 
 * Figure 4.42, 
Figure 4.43 
Loveseat 
Table 4.5 : Design Fire Information 
 
Figure 4.28 : Office Workstation Heat Release Rates 
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Figure 4.29 : Wardrobe Heat Release Rates 
 
Figure 4.30 : Book Case & Storage Heat Release Rates 
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Figure 4.31 : Stackable Chairs Heat Release Rates 
 
Figure 4.32 : Easy Chair Heat Release Rates 
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Figure 4.33 : Sofa Heat Release Rates 
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Figure 4.34 : Small Dresser 
 
Figure 4.35 : Small Dresser Heat Release Rate 
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Figure 4.36 : 3-Panel Workstation 
 
Figure 4.37 : Heat Release Rate for 3-Panel Workstation 
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Figure 4.38 : 2-Panel Workstation 
 
Figure 4.39 : Heat Release Rate for 2-Panel Workstation 
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Figure 4.40 : Sofa 
 
Figure 4.41 : Heat Release Rate for Sofa 
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Figure 4.42 : Loveseat 
 
Figure 4.43 : Heat Release Rate for Loveseat 
4.2.1 Analysis of Item Fire Results 
The risks associated with an item fire in a firecell may also be assessed using the same 
techniques as for the t² fires in the previous section. It is expected that the uneven 
growth rates, particularly the slow start followed by the rapid development that can be 
seen in most of the heat release rate graphs will have an effect on the conditions in the 
firecell and near the escape route. 
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Office Furniture Fires: Y0/21, Y0/22, 2 Panel Workstation & 3 Panel Workstation 
The furniture involved in these fires is typically found in an office environment, 
although could also be present in some crowd environments (eg the managers office). 
The safety of office occupants in the same firecell will first be assessed, followed by 
crowd occupants. Given the different (uneven) fire growth rates, it is necessary to re-
calculate the time at which the fire reaches a size that cannot be passed at various 
speeds and separation distances. These are shown in Table 4.6. 
1.2 m/s travel speed (work) 0.8 m/s travel speed (crowd) Fire 
Description 




3 m  
3069 kW 








1250 sec 1300 sec Not 
reached 
1140 sec 1275 sec 1350 sec 
Y0-22 Office 
Module 








323 sec 438 sec 484 sec 307 sec 420 sec 487 sec 
2 Panel 
Workstation 
240 sec 280 sec Not 
reached 
195 sec 255 sec Not 
reached 
Table 4.6 : Office Furniture Fires - Limiting Fire Times for Egress Separation 
The first feature of the analysis to be noted is the two distinct sets of results in Figure 
4.44. This is related to the shape of the heat release rate curve for test Y0/21 (shown 
in Figure 4.28), which stays relatively low (200-300kW) for a substantial period of 
time, before climbing rapidly to approximately 2200 kW, then dropping off just as 
rapidly. The lower points in Figure 4.44 are mostly scenarios dependent on heat 
detector activation. The fire does not get sufficiently large at an early stage to activate 
these detectors, but the smoke produced over the longer period of time allows manual 
detection to occur relatively early. Although the fire is too small to activate heat 
detectors at this point, smoke detectors are still sufficiently sensitive to also provide 
adequate warning of such a fire. 
The other office furniture heat release rate, Y0/22, has a higher plateau (at closer to 
500 kW), and a lower, more sustained peak (between 1000 kW and 1500 kW). This 
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plateau is high enough for earlier activation of heat detectors, and the peak is low 
enough to permit egress reasonably close to the fire. 
Reference to Figure 4.48 and Figure 4.49 confirm that in neither of these cases is 
obstruction by the fire likely to control egress, as manual and smoke detection both 
occur sufficiently early to allow egress past the fire while still small. As noted before, 
heat detectors typically operate too late to allow egress while the room is still tenable, 
let alone while the fire is small enough not to obstruct the escape route. 
 




Figure 4.45 : Available Escape Time from Y0/22 Office Furniture Fire in Work 
Environment 
The heat release rates from the NIST tests for the 2 and 3 panel workstations (refer 
Figure 4.36 and Figure 4.37) show the same tendency for a short plateau, before a 
quick growth to reach the peak heat release rates. However, the peak in the 3 panel 
workstation test is much greater than those observed in the other tests, and the plateau 
is shorter in both tests, particularly in the 2 panel workstation test. 
The shorter plateaus mean that the early warning from manual and smoke detection is 
not as significant in Figure 4.46 and Figure 4.47 in comparison to Figure 4.44 and 
Figure 4.45. Also noticeable in Figure 4.46 is that the tenability times can be quite 
long. This is due to the relatively short, contained duration of the fire, hence the 
limited quantity of smoke produced may not result in loss of tenability in the space. 
The size of peak heat release rates in both tests, however, is such that the fire could 
prevent egress if within 2-3 m of the escape route. 
Reference to Figure 4.50 and Figure 4.51 confirm this, and also clarify the extent of 
the obstruction problem. With the 2 panel workstation, the risk of obstruction 
increases with the travel distance. In smaller firecells, where the travel distance is less 
than 20 m, obstruction has no effect on the success rate, but as the travel distance 
increases, the critical separation distance increases past 2 m to 3 m. The initial plateau 
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in the 3 panel workstation test means that the earlier warning before the heat release 
rate peaks provides time to pass the fire before it peaks and obstructs the route. 
 
Figure 4.46 : Available Escape Time from 2 Panel Workstation Fire in Work 
Environment 
 




Figure 4.48 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – Y0/21 
Office Furniture Fire 
 
Figure 4.49 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – Y0/22 
Office Furniture Fire 
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Figure 4.50 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – 2 
Panel Workstation Fire 
 
Figure 4.51 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – 3 
Panel Workstation Fire 
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When sprinklers are installed, a similar pattern can be seen in the Y0/21 Office 
furniture fire in Figure 4.52. The low heat release rate plateau fails to activate the 
sprinklers, so successful egress is dependent on manual or smoke detection, allowing 
egress before tenability is lost. 
In Figure 4.53, results for the sprinkler controlled Y0/22 Office furniture fire are 
shown. This graph is also very similar to the results for the medium fire growth rate 
scenario comparison in Figure 4.21. Despite the differences between Figure 4.52 and 
Figure 4.53, Figure 4.56 and Figure 4.57 remain remarkably similar. These confirm 
that response to either manual or smoke detection gives a fairly high chance of 
successful egress, whereas response to sprinkler activation will more than likely be 
too late. 
The 2 and 3 panel workstation fire graphs, in Figure 4.54 and Figure 4.55, show this 
same trend, which is also continued in Figure 4.58 and Figure 4.59. 
 
Figure 4.52 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y0/21 Office Furniture Fire 
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Figure 4.53 : Available Egress Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y0/22 Office Furniture Fire 
 
Figure 4.54 : Available Egress Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – 2 Panel Workstation Fire 
152 
 
Figure 4.55 : Available Egress Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – 3 Panel Workstation Fire 
 
Figure 4.56 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Y0/21 Office Furniture Fire 
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Figure 4.57 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Y0/22 Office Furniture Fire 
 
Figure 4.58 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison  - 2 Panel Workstation Fire 
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Figure 4.59 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – 3 Panel Workstation Fire 
Mobile Crowd Environment with Office Furniture Fire 
When these office furniture fires are placed into a crowd environment, such as a shop, 
the occupants will tend to take longer to decide whether to evacuate, and due to the 
larger numbers of people at a higher occupant density, they will move more slowly. 
The particular furniture here, involving papers, desks, and computers, surrounded by 
part-height partitions, is unlikely to be located in the same room or space as the 
crowd. Therefore, obstruction of an egress route is unlikely. However, most, if not all, 
shops have a counter, often with a computer or cash register for sales and stock 
tracking. Such an arrangement is unlikely to have the higher fuel loads and peak heat 
release rates exhibited in some of the examples, although the Y0/22 office furniture 
fire could reasonably occur in this situation. 
The results of these analyses, shown in the Appendices, Section 12, confirm the trends 
noted previously. In a mobile crowd, or retail situation, manual and smoke detection 
give the most adequate warning, although when in a large firecell, heat detection may 
also provide adequate warning. A 2 m separation between the fire and the egress route 
is adequate all of these scenarios. 
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When a seated crowd, such as in a bar or restaurant, is exposed to such a fire, the 
increased pre-movement time means that the success rate is significantly lower. In 
particular, the failures are due to the increased fire size at the time of egress, and the 
consequently greater radiation to the escape route, obstructing egress. Such furniture 
would need to be located further than 3 m from the escape route to allow a reasonable 
expectation of success, even for the shorter travel distances. 
Soft Furnishing Fires: Y5.0/14, Y5.3/10, Y5.4/21, Loveseat & Sofa. 
The furniture involved in these fires may be found in a variety of environments, from 
office receptions, to furniture stores, and even bars and restaurants. The safety of 
office occupants in the same firecell will first be assessed, followed by retail and bar 
occupants. As before, it is necessary to calculate the time at which the fire reaches a 
size that cannot be passed at various speeds and separation distances. These are shown 
in Table 4.7. 
1.2 m/s travel speed (work) 0.8 m/s travel speed (crowd) Fire 
Description 




3 m  
3069 kW 









465 sec 530 sec Not 
reached 
440 sec 515 sec 540 sec 
Y5.3/10  
Easy Chair 
195 sec 230 sec Not 
reached 
185 sec 215 sec 240 sec 
Y5.4/21 
3-Seat Sofa 
130 sec 170 sec 270 sec 120 sec 152 sec 185 sec 
Loveseat  
(2-Seat Sofa) 
180 sec 270 sec 370 sec 120 sec 240 sec 310 sec 
Sofa (3-Seat) 160 sec 250 sec 370 sec 130 sec 210 sec 340 sec 
Table 4.7 : Soft Furnishing Fires - Limiting Times for Egress Separation 
As can be inferred from Figure 4.60, Figure 4.61, and Figure 4.62, the growth rate of 
these fires is relatively quick, and there is generally insufficient warning to allow 
egress within 2-3 m of the fires (unless the maximum heat release rate is less than 
2000 kW). In the case of the loveseat and sofa fires, where the available escape time 
is illustrated in Figure 4.63 and Figure 4.64 respectively, the growth rate of these fires 
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is considerably slower. This can be confirmed by comparing the heat release rate 
curves given in Figure 4.32, Figure 4.33, Figure 4.41, and Figure 4.43. The slower 
growth rate means that the occupants have more time to escape before the fire 
obstructs them, and it can be seen that the graphs for these fires have a greater number 
of scenarios above the line indicating successful egress within 2-3 m of the fire. 
This is confirmed in Figure 4.68 and Figure 4.69. 
First, reference to Figure 4.65, Figure 4.66, and Figure 4.67 indicates that successful 
egress from these spaces is affected if the fire is within 3 m of the escape route. In 
some small firecells, where the travel distance is less than 30 m, tenability tends to be 
the controlling condition, with a very small number of successful scenarios at all 
separations. 
In Figure 4.68 and Figure 4.69 the slower growth rate means that there is a greater 
success rate where egress is within 2 m of the escape route, and at short travel 
distances, even less separation is required. 
 
Figure 4.60 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment – Y5.0/14 
Stackable Chair Fire 
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Figure 4.61 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment – Y5.3/10 Chair 
Fire 
 




Figure 4.63 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment – Loveseat Fire 
 
Figure 4.64 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment – Sofa Fire 
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Figure 4.65 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Y5.0/14 Stackable Chair Fire 
 
Figure 4.66 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Y5.3/10 Chair Fire 
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Figure 4.67 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Y5.4/21 Sofa Fire 
 




Figure 4.69 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – Sofa 
Fire 
When sprinklers are provided, these still tend to respond too late to give any 
successful egress scenarios in the smaller firecells, particularly where the travel 
distance is less than 30 m.  There is relatively little variation between Figure 4.70 
through Figure 4.74, each having a similar spread of results, with no particularly 
unusual features. 
The success rates of these scenarios are shown in Figure 4.75 through Figure 4.79. 
Here the differences are slightly more marked. As noted in previous analyses, manual 
detection and smoke detection both occur before sprinkler activation. This is most 
noticeable in the mid-size firecells. In the larger firecells (60 m travel distance and up) 
there is little effect, and in the small firecells (up to 20 to 30 m travel distance), 
sprinkler operation is too late to sufficiently delay the loss of tenability (as observed 
in the standard t² fast fire growth rate earlier). 
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Figure 4.70 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y5.0/14 Stackable Chair Fire 
 
Figure 4.71 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y5.3/10 Chair Fire 
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Figure 4.72 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y5.4/21 Sofa Fire 
 
Figure 4.73 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Loveseat Fire 
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Figure 4.74 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Sofa Fire 
 
Figure 4.75 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Y5.0/14 Stackable Chair Fire 
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Figure 4.76 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Y5.3/10 Chair Fire 
 
Figure 4.77 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Y5.4/21 Sofa Fire 
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Figure 4.78 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Loveseat Fire 
 
Figure 4.79 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Sofa Fire 
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When these fires are considered in a crowd environment (mobile, such as retail, or 
seated, such as a bar or restaurant), and the escape scenarios are considered (see 
Appendices, Section 12), it can be seen that the increased pre-movement time 
significantly reduces the number of successful scenarios. Although similar separation 
requirements to those noted in the office occupancy remain applicable, the loss of 
tenability causes many failures. When sprinklers are provided, these remain most 
effective in the large firecells, with tenability typically being lost in the small areas 
before egress can be completed. 
Storage Fires: Y3.1/13, Y3.3/13 and Small Dresser 
The remaining fires to be considered are of a storage nature, being a wardrobe, a pair 
of bookcases, and a small dresser. These could typically occur in any occupancy. The 
limiting times for various travel speeds and separation distances are given in Table 
4.8. 
1.2 m/s travel speed (work) 0.8 m/s travel speed (crowd) Fire 
Description 




3 m  
3069 kW 








66 sec 90 sec 100 sec 65 sec 75 sec 95 sec 
Y3.3/13 
Bookcase 
245 sec 305 sec Not 
reached 




300 sec 413 sec Not 
reached 
240 sec 375 sec Not 
reached 
Table 4.8 : Storage Item Fires - Limiting Times for Passing Fires 
A comparison of the heat release rates for these items (refer Figure 4.29, Figure 4.30, 
and Figure 4.35) indicates significant differences in both the growth rate of the fire 
and the size of the peak heat release rate. The wardrobe fire is the most severe fire of 
the three, reaching a peak heat release rate of over 6000 kW less than 150 seconds 
after ignition. The bookcase arrangement peaks at just over 1500 kW, reached in 
approximately 300 seconds, and the small dresser reaches a similar peak in just over 
400 seconds. 
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Given the fast growth rate and high peak heat release rate of the wardrobe fire, it is 
un-surprising that like the ultra-fast t² fire, there are few successful scenarios apparent 
in Figure 4.80, as confirmed in Figure 4.83. 
The slower growth rates of the bookcase and dresser fires mean that there is a 
significant improvement in the success rates (see Figure 4.81 and Figure 4.82). Both 
of these fires will permit egress up to approximately 2 m from the fire, even at the 
peak heat release rate. This is confirmed in Figure 4.84 and Figure 4.85 where it can 
be seen that obstruction by the fire gradually affects egress as travel distance 
increases, with the maximum separation required being 2 m. 
 




Figure 4.81 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment – Y3.3/13 
Bookcase Fire 
 




Figure 4.83 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Y3.1/13 Wardrobe Fire 
 
Figure 4.84 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Y3.3/13 Bookcase Fire 
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Figure 4.85 : Work Environment Egress Scenario Outcome Comparison  - Small 
Dresser Fire 
When the wardrobe fire is placed in a sprinkler protected environment (see Figure 
4.86), the fire growth rate is still such that by the time the sprinklers control the fire, it 
is relatively large, and the smoke produced causes tenability to be lost comparatively 
quickly. 
Figure 4.89 confirms this, and also indicates that when sprinklers are installed at the 
maximum compliant spaces, tenability is not maintained long enough to allow any 
successful egress scenarios. 
For the other fires, sprinklers operate earlier, and are more effective in controlling the 
smoke production. As for the standard medium t² fire there is a reasonable chance of 
successful egress after manual detection where the firecell has a travel distance longer 
than 30-40 m. 
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Figure 4.86 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y3.1/13 Wardrobe Fire 
 
Figure 4.87 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y3.3/13 Bookcase Fire 
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Figure 4.88 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Small Dresser Fire 
 
Figure 4.89 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Y3.1/13 Wardrobe Fire 
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Figure 4.90 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Y3.3/13 Bookcase Fire 
 
Figure 4.91 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Egress Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Small Dresser Fire 
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When these item fires are placed in a crowd environment, similar trends can be seen. 
There are no successful egress scenarios for either occupancy during a wardrobe fire. 
There are some, but few, successful egress scenarios from the bookcase fire, and as 
noted earlier, these are more plentiful in the larger firecells. The small dresser fire 
permits an even greater number of successful egress outcomes, particularly in small 
firecells. 
Similarly, when sprinklers are provided, the same trends can be seen: 
•  No successful outcomes for compliant sprinklers and a wardrobe fire. 
•  In the two other fires, larger firecells give the best tenability times, and hence 
better success rates. 
4.2.2 Summary of Results of Item Fires 
When a review of the item fires analysed above is made, and the type of occupancies 
in which the items are likely to be found (or conversely, the types of items likely to be 
found in the occupancies considered), the results are summarised in Table 4.9, Table 




Item Fire Manual Detection Results Heat Detection Results Smoke Detection Results Sprinkler Protection Results 
Y0/21 Office 
Workstation  
The initial smouldering 
period produces enough 
smoke for early manual 
detection. If travel distance < 
10 m, tenability inadequate. 
20-40 m is mostly successful. 
>40 m virtually all successful. 
No obstruction problems. 
Very few successful 
outcomes  only when travel 
distance > 80 m, best rate 
when > 90 m, and a 3 m 
separation required. 
Similar or better results to 
manual detection, particularly 
when travel distance > 30 m. 
No obstruction problems. 
Smoke detection gives a few 
successes at < 20 m, and 
provides best warning where 
travel distance > 50 m. 
Response to sprinkler 
activation only successful in 
large firecell where travel 
distance > 90 m. 
Y0/22 Office 
Workstation  
Some success where travel 
distance < 10 m. Not 
acceptable success rate 
(~90% success) until > 50 m. 
No obstruction problems. 
Some success when > 50 m, 
but not >90% success until 
travel distance > 60 m. No 
obstruction problems 
Activates later than manual 
detection when travel 
distance < 30 m. Travel 
distances > 40 m give 
acceptable success rate. No 
obstruction problems. 
Manual detection gives a few 
successes at < 20 m travel 
distance, at greater distances 
smoke detection gives similar 
success rate. Acceptable 
success when smoke 
detection provided if travel 
distance > 50 m. Without 
smoke detection, need > 60 m 
travel distance. Response to 
sprinkler activation requires > 




Success rate not acceptable til 
travel distance > 50 m. 3 m 
separation required for 
success. 
Reasonable success rate when 
travel distance > 50 m. 3 m 
separation required. 
Some success at travel 
distances < 20 m so activates 
earlier than manual in this 
situation. Up to 60 m travel 
distance, 1 m separation ok, 
for further travel distance, 
need 2 m separation. 
Smoke detection gives a few 
successes for travel distance 
< 20 m, and is generally 
faster than manual. 
Reasonable success rate when 
travel distance > 50 m for 
manual, or 30 m for smoke 
detection, or 60 m for 




Not acceptable success rate til 
travel distance > 40 m, and 
separation is 3 m or more. At 
lesser travel distances, 
obstruction is less of a 
problem, but tenability causes 
failure. 
Reasonable success when 
travel distance > 20 m, but 
not acceptable til travel 
distance > 40 m. 2 m 
separation is adequate for 
most travel distances. 
Some success at < 20 m 
travel distance. Acceptable 
success rates at travel 
distance > 30 m. 2 m 
separation required for most 
travel distances. 
Smoke detection allows a few 
successful outcomes when 
travel distance < 20 m, and 
generally gives best results 
for all travel distances. 
Acceptable success rate for 
smoke detection reached 
when travel distance > 30 m. 
If only manual detection, 
need > 60 m travel distance, 
if responding to sprinkler 





No success til travel distance 
> 30 m, and not acceptable 
success rate til travel distance 
> 80 m. 3 m separation 
required. 
Some success when travel 
distances > 40 m, but not 
acceptable rates til travel 
distance > 60 m. 3 m 
separation required. 
Some success when travel 
distance < 30 m. Not 
acceptable success rates til 
travel distance > 50 m. 3 m 
separation required. 
Smoke detection typically 
occurs before manual 
detection. No successful 
outcomes less than 20 m 
travel distances. Smoke 
detectors give acceptable 
rates when travel distance > 
40 m. Manual and sprinkler 
detection give acceptable 




Some success for travel 
distances < 20 m, and no 
obstruction effect noticeable 
at this distance. With travel 
distances between 20 and 30 
m, separation of 2 m 
required, and above that need 
3 m. Acceptable success rate 
not reached for travel 
distances less than 60 m. 
Some success when travel 
distance > 40 m. Acceptable 
success when travel distance 
> 60 m. 3 m separation 
required. 
Some success when travel 
distance < 30 m. Acceptable 
success when travel distance 
> 60 m. 3 m separation 
required. 
Some success for manual 
detection, but not smoke 
detection, with travel 
distances < 20 m. Manual 
detection is sooner until 
travel distance exceeds 30 m. 
Smoke detection allows 
adequate success rate when 
travel distance > 60 m. 
Manual and sprinkler 
detection give adequate 
success rate when travel 
distance > 70 m. 
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Y5.4/21 Sofa  Some success when travel 
distance < 20 m, but 2 m 
separation required. 
Acceptable Levels of egress 
success not reached at any 
travel distance. 
No successful outcomes for 
travel distance < 40 m. 3 m 
separation required for 
success, but acceptable rates 
not reached. 
Some success for travel 
distance < 20 m, acceptable 
success where travel distance 
> 30 m. 3 m separation 
required, with greater 
separation at > 50 m travel 
distance. 
Some smoke detection, but 
not manual success at < 20 m 
travel distance. Smoke 
detection results in acceptable 
results at > 50 m travel 
distances. Manual detection 
acceptable at > 60 m travel. 
Loveseat  Some success at travel 
distances < 30 m. Need 50 m 
travel distance and 2 m 
separation for acceptable rate. 
60 m travel distance required 
for acceptable success rate, 
with 3 m separation. 
Some success < 30 m travel 
distance, acceptable success 
rate > 50 m travel distance. 2 
m separation required. 
Both manual and smoke 
detection allow some success 
< 30 m. Smoke response 
earlier when travel distance > 
30 m. Manual response gives 
acceptable success rate at > 
60 m, smoke detection 
requires > 50 m. 
Sofa  Some success < 30 m travel 
distance, 2 m separation 
required at this distance. 
Separation increases to > 3 m 
as distance increases. 
Acceptable success rates not 
met. 
Some success at > 40 m, and 
3 m separation. Acceptable 
rates not reached. 
Some success at < 30 m 
travel distance with 1 m 
separation. Acceptable 
success rates at > 50 m but 
fire can obstruct if within 3 m 
of the escape path. 
Both manual and smoke 
detection have some success 
at travel distances 20-30 m. 
Acceptable rates at travel 
distance > 50 m for smoke 





No successful outcomes No successful outcomes No successful outcomes Sprinkler heads need to be at 
closer than compliant 
spacings to control fire to 
permit evacuation. 
Acceptable success rates at > 
60 m travel distance for 




Some success at 20-30 m 
travel distance. Fires closer 
than 2 m start to control 
egress when travel distance > 
50 m, and 3 m separation 
required for acceptable rates. 
3 m separation and > 60 m 
travel distance required for 
acceptable success rate. 
No faster than manual 
detection when travel 
distance < 40 m. Acceptable 
success rate when travel 
distance > 40 m, and 2 m 
separation achieved. 
Some smoke detection 
success at < 20 m travel 
distances. Acceptable success 
for smoke detection at > 50 
m, and for manual detection 
at > 60 m. 
Small dresser  Some success above 20 m 
travel distance. Acceptable 
success rate when travel 
distance > 70 m. 3 m 
separation needed at that 
travel distance, though 
shorter travel distances are 
less affected by obstruction. 
Acceptable success rate at > 
70 m travel distance and 3 m 
separation. When travel 
distance < 50 m, obstruction 
doesnt occur when fire more 
than 2 m away. 
Some success when travel 
distance < 20 m. Typically 
faster than manual detection. 
Acceptable success rate at 
travel distance > 30, no fire 
obstruction for 1 m 
separation. 
Some smoke detector success 
for < 20 m travel distance, 
and smoke detection occurs 
before manual. Acceptable 
rates at smoke detection > 40 
m travel distance, and > 60 m 
for manual detection. 
Table 4.9 : Work Environment Fires 
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Item Fire and 
Environment 
Manual Detection Heat Detection Smoke Detection Sprinkler Protection 
Y0/22 Office 
Furniture  
Some success where travel 
distance < 20 m, but not 
acceptable rate til travel 
distance > 60 m. 2 m 
separation required to prevent 
obstruction for travel 
distances > 30 m. 
Acceptable rate when travel 
distance > 60 m, 2 m 
separation. 
Some success at approx 30 m 
travel distance, but not 
acceptable rate til > 50 m 
travel distance and 2 m 
separation. 
Manual detection gives some 
success below 20 m travel 
distance. Smoke detection 
earlier than manual where the 
travel distance > 40 m, 
otherwise, manual detection 
first. Acceptable result levels 
for smoke detection for travel 
distances > 50 m, manual 




No success < 30 m travel 
distance. Not acceptable til > 
80 m travel distance and > 3 
m separation. 
No success < 40 m travel 
distance. Not acceptable til > 
60 m travel distance and > 3 
m separation 
Some success < 30 m travel 
distance, but not acceptable 
til > 60 m travel distance and 
> 3 m separation. 
Smoke detection occurs 
before manual detection. 
Smoke detection acceptable 
where > 60 m travel distance, 
manual detection at > 70 m 
travel distance, sprinkler 
activation similar to manual 




Some success < 20 m where 
separation > 2 m. Not 
acceptable til travel distance 
> 80 m and separation > 3 m. 
No success til > 40 m travel 
distance, not acceptable til > 
70 m travel and > 3 m 
separation. 
No success til > 30 m travel, 
and not acceptable til > 60 m 
travel and > 3 m separation. 
Smoke detection before 
manual in small firecells. 
Smoke detection gives 
acceptable results where 
travel distance > 60 m. 
Manual detection acceptable 
where travel distance > 70 m, 
but need closer sprinkler 
spacings. 
Y5.4/21 Sofa  Some success possible, but 
doesnt reach acceptable 
levels 
Some success possible, but 
doesnt reach acceptable 
levels. 
Some success for travel 
distances < 20 m and 
separation > 1 m, but not 
acceptable til travel distance 
> 60 m and separation of 3 m. 
Smoke detection before 
manual in smaller firecells. 
Smoke detection gives 
acceptable results where the 
travel distance > 60 m. 
Manual detection results 
acceptable for travel distance 
> 70 but only for closer 
spaced sprinklers. 
Loveseat  Some success where travel 
distance > 30 m, but doesnt 
reach acceptable levels 
Acceptable success rates for 
travel distance > 70 m and 
more than 3 m separation. 
Some success > 30 m. 
Acceptable success rates for 
travel distance > 60 m and 
separation > 3 m. 
Smoke detectors activate 
before manual in small 
firecells. Smoke detectors 
give acceptable results for 
travel distances > 60 m, and 
manual detection > 70 m. 
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Sofa  Some success at 30 m travel 
distance and > 3 m 
separation, but doesnt reach 
acceptable success levels. 
Acceptable success rates 
where travel distance > 70 m 
and separation > 3 m. 
Some success at > 30 m 
travel distance and 3 m 
separation. Acceptable 
success rates require > 60 m 
travel distance with 3 m 
separation. 
Smoke detectors activate first 
in small firecells. Smoke 
detector results acceptable for 
travel distances > 60 m, 
manual detection is 
acceptable for travel 
distances > 70 m. 
Y3.1/13 
Wardrobe  
No successful outcomes No successful outcomes No successful outcomes Sprinkler heads need to be at 
closer than compliant 
spacings to control fire to 
permit evacuation. Up to 80% 




Some success at 20-30 m 
travel distance. 80 m travel 
distance and 3 m separation 
required for acceptable 
success rates. 
3 m separation and > 70 m 
travel distance required for 
acceptable success rate. 
Some success at > 20 m 
travel distance. At 30 m 
travel distance, 2 m 
separation required. 
Acceptable success rates at > 
60 m travel distance and 3 m 
separation. 
Some smoke detection 
success at > 20 m travel 
distances, as does manual. 
Acceptable success for smoke 
detection at > 50 m, and for 
manual detection at > 70 m. 
Small dresser  Some success above 20 m 
travel distance. Acceptable 
success rate when travel 
distance > 70 m. 3 m 
separation. 
Acceptable success rate at > 
70 m travel distance and 3 m 
separation. 
Some success when travel 
distance < 20 m. Typically 
faster than manual detection. 
Acceptable success rate at 
travel distance > 30, 2 m 
separation required. 
No smoke detector success 
for < 20 m travel distance, 
but smoke detection occurs 
before manual. Acceptable 
rates at smoke detection > 40 
m travel distance, and > 70 m 
for manual detection. 
Table 4.10 : Mobile Crowd Environment Fires 
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Item Fire and 
Environment 
Manual Detection Heat Detection Smoke Detection Sprinkler Protection 
Y0/22 Office 
Furniture  
Little success for travel 
distances > 30 m, and fire 
separation to escape route of 
3 m or less. Acceptable rates 
at travel distance > 60 m, but 
not if fire 3 m or closer to 
escape route. 
Acceptable when travel 
distance > 60 m and fire 
further than 3 m from escape 
route. 
Acceptable when travel 
distance > 50 m and fire 
further than 3 m from escape 
route. 
Smoke and manual response 
at similar times in smaller 
firecells. Smoke detection 
gives acceptable results when 
travel distance > 50 m, 





No successful outcomes with 
travel distance < 30 m. 
Acceptable level of success 
where travel distance > 90 m 
and separation > 3 m. 
No success < 50 m travel 
distance. Acceptable level of 
success where travel distance 
> 90 m and separation > 3 m. 
No success < 30 m travel 
distance. Acceptable levels 
when travel distance > 60 m 
and 3 m separation provided. 
Smoke detection before 
manual in small firecells. 
Smoke detection gives 
acceptable rate at > 70 m, 
manual at > 80 m. 
Y5.3/10 Easy 
Chair  
No success for travel 
distances < 40 m. Acceptable 
success levels reached when 
travel distance > 70 m and 
separation > 3 m. 
Acceptable level of success 
when travel distance > 70 m 
and separation > 3 m. 
Little success where travel 
distance < 40 m. Not 
acceptable til travel distance 
> 70 m. > 3 m separation 
required. 
Smoke detection before 
manual detection. Closer 
spaced sprinklers required for 
acceptable success rate, at 
travel distance > 60 m for 
smoke detection and > 70 m 
for manual detection. 
Y5.4/21 Sofa  No success for travel distance 
< 60 m. Acceptable levels not 
reached. Obstruction when 
fire within 3 m of escape 
route. 
Some success at 30 m travel 
distance. Acceptable Levels 
not reached. Obstruction 
when fire within 3 m of 
escape route. 
Some success at < 20 m 
travel distance, but acceptable 
success levels not reached. 
Obstruction when fire within 
3 m of escape route. 
Smoke detection before 
manual detection. Smoke 
detection gives acceptable 
success rate when travel 
distance > 60 m, manual 
detection when travel 
distance > 80 m. 
Loveseat  Some success at 30 m travel 
distance. Acceptable levels 
Some success at 50 m travel 
distances, but acceptable 
Some success at 30 m travel 
distance. Acceptable success 
Smoke detection operates 
before manual detection. 
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not reached. Fire tends to 
obstruct if within 3 m of 
route. 
success rates not reached. 
Fire tends to obstruct if 
within 3 m of route. 
levels at travel distances > 70 
m and > 3 m separation. 
Smoke detection gives 
acceptable success rate when 
travel distance > 60 m, 
manual when travel distance 
> 70 m. 
Sofa  Some success at 40 m travel 
distances and 3 m 
separations. Acceptable 
success rate not reached. 
Some success at 40 m travel 
distance and 3 m separations. 
Acceptable success rate not 
reached. 
Some success at 30 m travel 
distance. Acceptable success 
rate reached at travel distance 
> 70 m and separation > 3 m. 
Smoke detection operates 
before manual detection. 
Smoke detection gives 
acceptable success rate for 
travel distance > 60 m, 
manual detection needs 70 m. 
Y3.1/13 
Wardrobe  
No successful outcomes No successful outcomes No successful outcomes Sprinkler heads need to be at 
closer than compliant 
spacings to control fire to 
permit evacuation. Up to 80% 




Some success at 20-30 m 
travel distance. 80 m travel 
distance and 3 m separation 
required for acceptable 
success rates. 
3 m separation and > 80 m 
travel distance required for 
acceptable success rate. 
Some success at > 30 m 
travel distance. At 30 m 
travel distance, 3 m 
separation required. 
Acceptable success rates at > 
60 m travel distance and 3 m 
separation. 
Some smoke detection 
success at > 20 m travel 
distances, as does manual. 
Acceptable success for smoke 
detection at > 60 m, and for 
manual detection at > 80 m. 
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Small dresser  Some success above 20 m 
travel distance. Acceptable 
success rate when travel 
distance > 80 m. 3 m 
separation. 
Acceptable success rate at > 
70 m travel distance and 3 m 
separation. 
Some success when travel 
distance > 20 m. Typically 
faster than manual detection. 
Acceptable success rate at 
travel distance > 50, 2 m 
separation required. 
No smoke detector success 
for < 20 m travel distance, 
but smoke detection occurs 
before manual. Acceptable 
rates at smoke detection > 50 
m travel distance, and > 70 m 
for manual detection. 




For a working environment, the greatest hazard is from a wardrobe or coat cupboard, 
which may have an ultra-fast fire growth rate and a very high peak heat release rate. 
No warning system is adequate to provide sufficient time for egress in such a 
situation. Where sprinklers are provided, these may not activate fast enough to control 
such a fire to allow egress, and the arrangement of the wardrobe may also shield the 
fire from the sprinklers. Only in large firecells where the sprinkler spacing is reduced 
are there any successful egress outcomes from a wardrobe fire. 
The other items found in an office typically have a slower growth rate, a lower peak 
heat release rate, and often have an initial plateau phase with a low heat release rate. 
The lower peaks mean that the fire is less likely to obstruct egress, and slower growth 
rates provide more warning, particularly when preceded by a smouldering phase. The 
smouldering phase seen in the item fire tests produces adequate smoke for early 
manual or even smoke detection, without causing loss of tenability too early. For 
these fires, the continuing trend is for relatively early loss of tenability in small 
firecells, but generally successful outcomes in larger firecells. When the fire is within 
2-3 m of the escape route, it may obstruct it, but this should be balanced against the 
risk of the fire being in exactly that position, particularly if this is a single critical area 
in a large firecell. 
Of greater concern are the results from chair and sofa fires. These tend to have a 
relatively fast growth rate, and a sufficiently high peak heat release rate that may 
obstruct the escape route if the item is within 2-3 of the route. 
Usually, manual detection in smaller firecells and smoke detection in larger firecells 
provides the earliest warning (and therefore most chance of a successful outcome). 
Heat detection is usually later than manual detection, but is often adequate for longer 
travel distances. 
Where sprinklers are provided, these typically activate too late to be of much benefit 
in improving the tenability time in small firecells. They will, however, typically limit 
the fire size so it provides less of an obstruction to egress. 
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Crowd Environment 
Many of the item fires that could occur in an office situation are also relevant to 
crowd situations. The longer pre-movement times associated with this class of 
occupancy mean that the trends noted in the office occupancy are continued, but 
success rates, particularly in small firecells, are significantly reduced. 
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5 RISK ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS 
To assess the levels of risk associated with a design compliant with the requirements 
of the Acceptable Solutions C/AS1 to the New Zealand Building Code, the probability 
of a successful result for each scenario will be found. These are to be carried out for 
work and crowd (both mobile and seated) occupancies, and are based on the results 
from the previous section for the relevant item fires. The risk levels, and probability 
of success will be assessed for the permitted travel distances, as determined by the 
detection and/or suppression systems provided. 
First, consider an open plan office. Where no detectors are provided, the maximum 
permissible dead end open path travel distance is 24 m. When heat detectors are 
provided, this distance is permitted to increase to 28.8 m, and smoke detectors mean 
that a distance of 48 m is permissible. When sprinklers are installed, the permissible 
distance is 48 m, increasing to 72 m when smoke detection is also provided. 
Given the open plan nature it is also assumed that there are multiple escape routes 
within the office, leading to a single final exit. It is therefore at this exit only that a 
fire may obstruct egress. 
The following tables give the successful egress rates for the conditions permitted by 
the Acceptable Solutions, for the various item and standard fires previously noted. 
The success rates provided in Table 5.1 for the office occupancy, and are determined 
from the following scenarios: 
•  Firstly, on average manual detection (as defined in section 3.3.3), where the 
travel distance is no greater than 24 m, and the fire may be within 1 m, 2 m, 3 m, 
or further than 3 m from the escape route. 
•  Next, the first row for each fire under the heat detection heading gives the success 
rate when occupants with a travel distance of no further than 28.8 m respond to 
heat detection activation. These detectors are assumed to be installed at the 
maximum compliant spacing (ie scenario 5). The second row gives the success 
rate for the same conditions, but when the occupants respond to average manual 
detection rather than waiting for heat detector activation. 
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•  A similar arrangement is given for scenarios where smoke detection is provided, 
and the travel distance is no more than 48 m. Again, scenario 5 smoke detection 
response is given in the first row, with average manual detection response in the 
second row. 
•  Finally, sprinkler protection is considered. The first column in this section 
assumes a travel distance no greater than 48 m, response to manual detection, and 
that the fire is controlled by sprinklers installed to compliant spacings (ie scenario 
5). In the second column, the success rate for response to smoke detection is given 
and a travel distance of 72 m, with the second row number being response to 
manual detection at the same travel distance. The effect of the separation of the 
fire from the escape route has not been specifically addressed in this table, as the 
effect of sprinkler operation on the fire size is assumed to result in a fairly uniform 
fire size as noted in section 4.1.2. 
•  Where the proximity of the fire to the egress route has reduced the egress success 
rate, the cell is highlighted. 
The equivalent results for the corresponding travel distance limits are also given for 
the two crowd occupancies in Table 5.2 and Table 5.3. 
These results confirm the following trends previously noted: 
•  As the travel distance (and hence the firecell size) increases, so does the 
probability of a successful evacuation, even when the means of detection remains 
manual. 
•  At the longer travel distances, usually only permitted when smoke detectors are 
installed, there is no rule apparent that indicates that smoke detection will occur 
before manual detection, or vice versa. This appears to depend on the fire and 
firecell. 
•  A smouldering fire is most likely to activate smoke detectors before an 
adequate smoke layer has formed to allow manual detection, but 
•  if the plateau of heat release rate is a little higher, then manual detection may 
occur first in smaller firecells. 
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•  If the fire has a slow growth rate, manual detection will occur first, but 
medium and faster fire growth rates reverses the order. 
•  Many of the fires analysed have a very small number of successful outcomes. 
However, relatively few of the failures are controlled by the separation between 
the fire and the escape route. When the travel distance is less than 24 m, none of 
the outcomes fail due to radiation only. As the travel distance increases to 28.8 m, 
some fires may obstruct up to 14% of the outcomes, and when the travel distance 
is 48 m, this increases to up to 81% (in the case of the Y5.4/21 Sofa fire in the 
office scenario). 
•  Where sprinklers are provided, without smoke detectors, and the travel distance is 
no more than 48 m, there is little difference in the success rate. When the travel 
distance is further increased as permitted due to provision of smoke detectors, 
there is a further increase in the success rates. Much of this increase is due to the 
increased firecell size and resulting increased tenability time, and not due to 
improved detection. This can be seen in the increased success rate for manual 
detection only at the larger distance. Smoke detectors do increase the success rate 
in large firecells as the volume of smoke required for detection of the fire is much 
greater than that produced before smoke detectors activate. 
To assess the comparative risk of being obstructed by a fire, we look at the probability 
that the fire might be located where it could obstruct the egress route. The Y5.4/21 
Sofa fire has been selected as this is the one that appears to have the greatest 
obstructive influence on the escape route. The probability of success when the fire is 
far from the escape route is 0.83, or 83%, reducing to 0.02 or 2% when the fire is 1 m 
from the escape route. It is assumed that this fire has an equal chance of being located 
anywhere in the firecell, and that the probabilities of success are as given in Table 5.1 
below. Obstruction may occur when the fire is within 3 m of the egress route, but 
there is a greater risk of obstruction at closer distances. The probability that the fire is 
within a separation distance, S of the escape route is given in Equation 5.1. Review of 
the firecell sizes complying with the 48 m travel distance limit indicates an average 
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⋅+⋅−==> mSP  Equation 5.5 
To consider the probability that the fire is in that location, combined with the 
probability that it will prevent egress. For a 1 m separation, the probability of failure 
due to radiation is the probability of failure due to tenability, 0.83, minus the 
probability of failure where the fire is 1 m from the escape route, 0.02, giving a 
difference of 0.81. There is a 0.02 probability of success where the separation is 1 m, 
and a 0.83 probability of success when the fire is not close to the escape route (refer 
Table 5.1 for the source of the probabilities). Similarly for 2 m and 3 m, the resulting 
probabilities are 0.55(=0.83-0.28) and 0.03(=0.83-0.80) respectively, and the 
probability of failure due to loss of tenability is 0.17 (being the converse of the 
probability of success which is 0.83). The probability, then, of failure is calculated in 
Equation 5.6, at 0.18. Conversely, the probability of success is 0.82 - just 0.01 less 
than the probability of failure if the fire is distant from the escape route. 
Pfailure = 0.011×0.81+0.025×0.55+0.039×0.03+0.925×0.17 
           = 0.18 
Equation 5.6 
To summarise, the probability of successful egress for a firecell is related to the size 
of the firecell, and the larger the firecell, the more likely a successful result will occur. 
There are a number of item fires that have a particularly poor success rate. In 
particular, the wardrobe fire, the sofa fire from NIST, and other soft furniture to a 
slightly lesser extent. While the wardrobe may be a particularly severe test, the other 
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furniture items are not particularly unusual in these situations and therefore be an 
unexpected hazard 
To the advantage of the occupants in this situation, there is, however, a tendency for 
real fires to smoulder initially, or even to burn at a slower initial heat release rated 
before properly catching. This stage has a significant advantage in that the smoke 
produced will tend to hasten manual detection, and if installed, smoke detection, 
increasing the time otherwise available for evacuation. This phase does not appear to 
significantly reduce the available egress time, unless detection is dependent on heat 
detector activation, which is less likely to occur at a similarly early stage. 
As the firecell size and the travel distance increase, the probability that the fire will be 
located in the area that may obstruct egress decreases. Note that the above comment 
assumes that the open plan nature of the ceiling reflects the provision of multiple 
routes to the final exit. If there is a single route, then the area in which the fire might 





Manual Detection (24 m 
travel distance) 
Heat Detection (28.8 m travel 
distance) 
Smoke Detection (48 m travel 
distance) 
Fire 










0%∗  0% 0% 0% 84% 84% 84% 84% 92%† Office 
Y0/21 
22% 22% 22% 22% 
46% 46% 46% 46% 71% 71% 71% 71% 
71%§ 
85% 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 60%† 60% 60% 60% 79%† Office 
Y0/22 
35% 35% 35% 35% 
40% 40% 40% 40% 63% 63% 63% 63% 
63%§ 
76% 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 82%† 85% 85% 85% 92%† 2 Panel 
Workstation 
14% 14% 14% 14% 
23% 25% 25% 25% 8% 21% 47% 47% 
47%§ 
68% 
16%* 18% 18% 18% 82%† 82% 82% 82% 92%† 3 Panel 
Workstation 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
18% 18% 18% 18% 23% 32% 60% 60% 
60%§ 
76% 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 0% 2% 4%† Wardrobe 
Y3.1/13 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
0% 
3%* 3% 3% 3% 86%† 86% 86% 86% 94%† Small 
Dresser 
17% 17% 17% 17% 
31% 31% 31% 31% 34% 54% 54% 54% 
54%§ 
67% 
Fire Manual Detection (24 m 
travel distance) 
Heat Detection (28.8 m travel 
distance) 






                                                 
∗  These percentage success rates assume response to heat detector activation 
 These percentage success rates assume response to smoke detector activation 
§ These percentage success rates assume response to manual detection, with sprinkler activation usually occurring later 
 These percentage success rates assume response to manual detection 
198 





0%∗  0% 0% 0% 10% 47% 52% 52% 74%† Bookcase 
Y3.3/13 
18% 18% 18% 18% 
25% 37% 37% 37% 9%‡ 39% 52% 52% 
52%§ 
60%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 1%† 42% 53% 53% 76%† Stackable 
Chairs 
Y5.0/14 
0% 13% 13% 13% 
0%‡ 14% 14% 14% 0%‡ 8% 25% 25% 
31%§ 
50%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 31% 13% 61%† Easy Chair 
Y5.3/10 
3% 11% 11% 11% 
2%‡ 7% 12% 12% 0%‡ 2% 10% 10% 
8%§ 
24%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 2%† 28% 80% 83% 91%† Sofa 
Y5.4/21 
0% 6% 9% 9% 
0%‡ 3% 8% 10% 0%‡ 1% 4% 10% 
12%§ 
25%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0†%† 41% 41% 41% 68%† Loveseat 6% 6% 6% 6% 
8%‡ 10% 10% 10% 3%‡ 23% 29% 29% 
29%§ 
50%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 31% 34% 34% 66%† Sofa 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 2% 2% 2% 0%‡ 7% 16% 16% 
18%§ 
45%‡ 
Fire Manual Detection (24 m 
travel distance) 
Heat Detection (28.8 m travel 
distance) 






                                                 
∗  These percentage success results assume response to heat detector activation 
 These percentage success results assume response to smoke detector activation 
§ These percentage success rates assume response to manual detection, with sprinkler activation usually occurring later 
 These percentage success results assume response to manual detection 
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1 m 2 m 3 m >3 m 1 m 2 m 3 m >3 m 1 m 2 m 3 m >3 m travel 
distance) 
Detectors 
(72 m travel 
distance) 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 42% 42% 42% 42% 69%† Slow Fire 35% 35% 35% 35% 
54% 54% 54% 54% 71%‡ 71% 71% 71% 
71%§ 
82%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 13%† 57% 57% 57% 78%† Medium Fire 12% 12% 12% 12% 
23%‡ 23% 23% 23% 9%‡ 45% 45% 45% 
46%§ 
62%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 7% 7% 35%† Fast Fire 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
6%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 1% 10% 12%† Ultra-Fast 
Fire 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
0%‡ 
Table 5.1 : Probability of Successful Evacuation from Work Occupancy 
                                                 
* These percentage success results assume response to heat detector activation 
 These percentage success results assume response to smoke detector activation 
§ These percentage success results assume response to manual detection, with sprinkler activation usually occurring later 
 These percentage success results assume response to manual detection 
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Manual Detection (18 m 
travel distance) 
Heat Detection (21.6 m travel 
distance) 
Smoke Detection (36 m travel 
distance) 
Fire 







(54 m travel 
distance) 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 50% 50% 50% 50% 84%† Office 
Y0/21 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
5% 5% 5% 5% 46%‡ 46% 46% 46% 
57%§ 
75%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 21% 21% 21% 57%† Office 
Y0/22 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
12%‡ 12% 12% 12% 3%‡ 22% 22% 22% 
22%§ 
48%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 1%† 33% 43% 43% 70%† 2 Panel 
Workstation 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 4% 13% 13% 
13%§ 
34%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 35%† 50% 50% 50% 76%† 3 Panel 
Workstation 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 1%‡ 19% 25% 25% 
25%§ 
48%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 0% 0% 0%† Wardrobe 
Y3.1/13 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
0%‡ 
4%* 4% 4% 4% 46%† 56% 56% 56% 79%† Small 
Dresser 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
4%‡ 4% 4% 4% 2%‡ 14% 14% 14% 
14%§ 
30%‡ 
                                                 
* Response to heat detector activation 
 Response to smoke detection 
§ Response to manual detection 
 Response to manual detection 
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Manual Detection (18 m 
travel distance) 
Heat Detection (21.6 m travel 
distance) 
Smoke Detection (36 m travel 
distance) 
Fire 







(54 m travel 
distance) 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 4% 4% 36%† Bookcase 
Y3.3/13 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 5% 11% 11% 
11%§ 
17%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 5% 8% 9% 41%† Stackable 
Chairs 
Y5.0/14 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 1% 1% 
1%§ 
12%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 31% 31% 16%† Easy Chair 
Y5.3/10 
0% 6% 6% 6% 
0%‡ 3% 3% 3% 0%‡ 1% 1% 1% 
1%§ 
2%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 1%† 10% 29% 29% 59%† Sofa 
Y5.4/21 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 1% 1% 1% 
1%§ 
2%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 3% 3% 3% 26%† Loveseat 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 1% 2% 2% 
2%§ 
14%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 0% 0% 23%† Sofa 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
9%‡ 
                                                 
* Response to heat detector activation 
 Response to smoke detector activation 
§ Response to sprinkler activation 
 Response to manual detection 
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Manual Detection (18 m 
travel distance) 
Heat Detection (21.6 m travel 
distance) 
Smoke Detection (36 m travel 
distance) 
Fire 







(54 m travel 
distance) 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 3% 3% 3% 38%† Slow Fire 8% 8% 8% 8% 
13% 13% 13% 13% 41%‡ 44% 44% 44% 
44%§ 
58%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 4% 4% 4% 41%† Medium Fire 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 9% 9% 9% 
9%§ 
27%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 7% 7% 35%† Fast Fire 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
6%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 0% 0% 12%† Ultra-Fast 
Fire 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
0%‡ 
Table 5.2 : Probability of Successful Evacuation from Mobile Crowd (Retail) Occupancy 
                                                 
* Response to heat detector activation 
 Response to smoke detector activation 
§ Response to manual detection 
 Response to manual detection 
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Manual Detection (18 m 
travel distance) 
Heat Detection (21.6 m travel 
distance) 
Smoke Detection (36 m travel 
distance) 
Fire 







(54 m travel 
distance) 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 42% 42% 42% 42% 81%† Office 
Y0/21 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 30% 30% 30% 30% 
44%§ 
68%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 0% 4% 43%† Office 
Y0/22 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 6% 0%‡ 0% 0% 8% 
8%§ 
34%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 32% 32% 32% 59%† 2 Panel 
Workstation 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 8% 8% 8% 
8%§ 
26%‡ 
0%* 12% 84% 84% 3%† 40% 85% 85% 83%† 3 Panel 
Workstation 
0% 0% 43% 43% 
0%‡ 0% 44% 44% 0%‡ 1% 44% 44% 
55%§ 
55%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0%† 0% 0% 0% 0%† Wardrobe 
Y3.1/13 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
0%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 16%† 33% 33% 33% 66%† Small 
Dresser 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 5% 5% 5% 
5%§ 
20%‡ 
                                                 
* Response to heat detector activation 
 Response to smoke detector activation 
§ Response to manual detection 
 Response to manual detection 
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Manual Detection (18 m 
travel distance) 
Heat Detection (21.6 m travel 
distance) 
Smoke Detection (36 m travel 
distance) 
Fire 







(54 m travel 
distance) 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 24% Bookcase 
Y3.3/13 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 2% 3% 3% 
3%§ 
7%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 4% 29% Stackable 
Chairs 
Y5.0/14 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
6%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 9% Easy Chair 
Y5.3/10 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
0%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 39% Sofa 
Y5.4/21 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
0%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 1% 2% 2% 19% Loveseat 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 1% 1% 1% 
1%§ 
7%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 14% Sofa 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
5%‡ 
                                                 
* Response to heat detector activation 
 Response to smoke detector activation 
§ Response to manual detection 
 Response to manual detection 
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Manual Detection (18 m 
travel distance) 
Heat Detection (21.6 m travel 
distance) 
Smoke Detection (36 m travel 
distance) 
Fire 







(54 m travel 
distance) 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 30% Slow Fire 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0% 0% 0% 0% 24%‡ 31% 31% 31% 
31%§ 
48%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 29% Medium Fire 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
14%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 2% 2% 24% Fast Fire 0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
3%‡ 
0%* 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 7% Ultra-Fast 
Fire 
0% 0% 0% 0% 
0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 0%‡ 0% 0% 0% 
0%§ 
0%‡ 
Table 5.3 : Probability of Successful Evacuation from Crowd (Bar) Occupancy
                                                 
* Response to heat detector activation 
 Response to smoke detector activation 
§ Response to manual detection 
 Response to manual detection 
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6 ANALYSIS OF FIRE SERVICE STATISTICS 
6.1  Injury Occurrence and Severity 
The following section is based on information provided by the New Zealand Fire 
Service, detailing the numbers and circumstances of injuries received as a result of 
fires during the 2000/01 reporting period and the 2001/02 reporting period. The main 
data is reported in Table 6.1. 
Out of all fires, approximately 2% result in injuries. When the fire involves a structure 
(ie a Structure Fire), the injury rate increases to approximately 5%. The greatest 
number and percentage of injuries occur in residential fires, with the least occurring in 
active purpose group fires (both crowd and working occupancies have low numbers 
and rates of injuries). Structure fires are typically classified as either with damage 
or without damage, the latter being where there is no damage to the building fabric. 
Of greatest relevance to this study are the numbers and seriousness of injuries 
sustained by people who were alert at the time of the fire, as well as the situation in 
which they were received. Some of the residential fires may be included if the 
occupants were not asleep or otherwise incapacitated. 
In Table 6.2, the initial locations, and actions of these occupants is summarised, 
showing the numbers of occupants in the same area as the fire, whether they were 
alert, and whether they were injured while escaping, of whether other non-evasive 
actions were being taken while the injury was sustained. 
This information is also presented in graphical form in Figure 6.1 through Figure 6.7 
Reference to Figure 6.1 indicates that nearly half the fires that occur in structure do 
not cause damage (ie damage to the building fabric).  
Figure 6.2 shows what proportion of structure fires involve the different purpose 
groups. The most significant group is residential fires, comprising nearly 70% of all 
fires involving structures. There are relatively few Working Environment or 
Crowd Use structure fires, each comprising approximately 10% of structure fires. 
208 
Figure 6.3 indicates where victims were when injured, and whether they were awake. 
Given the large proportion of residential fires, it is not surprising that 44% were 
asleep.  
A total of 36% were awake and in the same space as the fire, with the remainder being 
elsewhere. 
The Building Code is not required to address property protection, and the generally 
accepted advice is that on discovery of a fire, occupants should notify others then 
leave the building. It is not generally recommended for occupants to undertake fire-
fighting activities due to the risks associated with inadequate tools and protection. 
Therefore, Figure 6.4 has been created to illustrate the differing rates of injury relating 
to avoidance behaviour, relative to fire-fighting behaviour. This shows that there is a 
far greater rate of injury involved in fire-fighting behaviour, with a greater number of 
more serious injuries. 
Figure 6.5 confirms the trends for injury seriousness noted above, although 
interestingly, the relative proportions of these numbers appear to indicate that fire-
fighting activities tend to result in less serious injuries. This is because of the large 
number of minor injuries sustained during this activity. It would be reasonable to 
assume that these injuries would not have occurred if the victim had avoided the fire 
instead. The greatest risk of severe injury occurs to occupants who are asleep or 
otherwise incapacitated. The relative occurrence of fire-fighting behaviour versus 
avoidance is not known, so the risk of injury for each type of behaviour cannot be 
quantified. 
Figure 6.6 indicates the number of fires in each category that result in injuries to 
occupants. Mostly, structure fires are involved, but there is relatively little difference 
whether the fire is one involving damage to the structure or not. Most of the structure 
fires are in residential properties, with comparatively few being in crowd or 
working environments. 
The general conclusion that can be drawn from this is that residential fires are most 
likely to result in injuries to the occupants. With this occupancy, there is a reasonable 
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chance that occupants may be asleep or incapacitated, and also it is expected (though 
this cannot be confirmed by the data) that those who are awake will tend to attempt to 
fight the fire.  
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Type of Fire 2000/01 2001/02 Total 2000-
2002 
All Fires 22280 20424 42704 
no. of injuries 343 1.5% 477 2.3% 820 1.9% 
no. resulting in injuries 300 1.3% 425 2.1% 725 1.7% 
All Structure Fires (including 
unclassified)  
6418 29% 6554 32% 12972 30% 
no. of injuries 250 3.9% 386 5.9% 636 4.9% 
no. resulting in injuries 228 3.6% 346 5.3% 574 4.4% 
Structure Fire with damage 2388 37% 2625 40% 5013 39% 
no. of injuries 135 5.7% 239 9.1% 374 7.5% 
no. resulting in injuries 119 5.0% 211 8.0% 330 6.6% 
Structure Fire without damage  3117 49% 3101 47% 6218 48% 
no. of injuries 114 3.5% 146 4.3% 260 3.9% 
no. resulting in injuries 108 3.7% 134 4.7% 242 4.2% 
Residential Structure Fires  4239 66% 4788 73% 9027 70% 
no. of injuries 232 5.5% 357 7.5% 589 6.5% 
no. resulting in injuries 211 5.0% 317 6.6% 528 5.8% 
Working Environment Structure 
Fires  
667 10% 831 13% 1498 12% 
no. of injuries 12 1.8% 12 1.4% 24 1.6% 
no. resulting in injuries 11 1.6% 12 1.4% 23 1.5% 
Crowd Use Structure Fires  522 8% 675 10% 1197 9% 
no. of injuries 6 1.1% 17 2.5% 23 1.9% 
no. resulting in injuries 6 1.1% 17 2.5% 23 1.9% 
All Active Purpose Group Structure 
Fires 
1189 19% 1506 23% 2695 21% 
No. of injuries 18 1.5% 29 1.9% 47 1.7% 
No. resulting in injuries 17 1.4% 29 1.9% 46 1.7% 
Table 6.1 : Fire Service Injury Statistics 
Note: Injuries and Fires resulting in injuries are also indicated as a percentage of the 
total number of fires in the relevant category and period. 
The number of structural fires are also indicated as a percentage of the total 
number of fires. 
The number of categories of structural fires (eg structural with damage, crowd 
use) are also indicated as a percentage of all structural fires. 
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Injuries and Severity 2000/01 2001/02 Total 
Total Injuries in Structure 
Fires 
250 386 636 
Fatal 19 8% 29 8% 48 8% 
Life Threatening 18 7% 10 3% 28 4% 
Moderate 90 36% 170 44% 260 41% 
Injury 
Severity 
Slight 123 49% 177 46% 300 47% 
Injured Occupants Awake 139 56% 215 56% 354 56% 
Fatal 5 4% 2 1% 7 2% 
Life Threatening 6 4% 2 1% 8 2% 
Moderate 43 31% 103 48% 146 41% 
Injury 
Severity 
Slight 84 60% 108 50% 192 54% 
Injured Occupants Asleep or 
otherwise incapacitated 
111 44% 171 44% 282 44% 
Fatal 14 13% 27 16% 41 15% 
Life Threatening 12 11% 8 5% 20 7% 
Moderate 47 42% 67 39% 114 40% 
Injury 
Severity 
Slight 38 34% 68 40% 106 38% 
Injured Occupants awake and 
in the same space as the fire 
85 34% 130 34% 215 34% 
Fatal 3 4% 2 2% 5 2% 
Life Threatening 4 5% 1 1% 5 2% 
Moderate 22 26% 59 45% 81 38% 
Injury 
Severity 
Slight 56 66% 68 52% 124 58% 
Injured Occupants awake but 
not in same space as fire 
54 22% 85 22% 139 22% 
Fatal 2 2% 2 2% 5 2% 
Life Threatening 2 2% 1 1% 5 2% 
Moderate 21 25% 59 45% 81 38% 
Injury 
Severity  
Slight 29 34% 68 52% 124 58% 
Occupants Escape 26 31% 48 37% 74 34% 
Fatal 1 4% 2 4% 3 4% 
Life Threatening 1 4% 0 0% 1 1% 
Moderate 9 35% 25 52% 34 46% 
Injury 
Severity 
Slight 15 58% 21 44% 36 49% 
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Occupants Do Not attempt 
Escape 
59 69% 82 63% 141 66% 
Fatal 2 3% 0 0% 2 1% 
Life Threatening 3 5% 1 1% 4 3% 
Moderate 13 22% 34 41% 47 33% 
Injury 
Severity 
Slight 41 69% 47 57% 88 62% 
Table 6.2 : Injury Severity, Occupant Location, Alertness and Response 
 
Figure 6.1 : Classification of Structure Fires 
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Figure 6.2 : Purpose Groups in Structure Fires 
 
Figure 6.3 : Location and Alertness of Injured Occupants 
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Figure 6.4 : Activity of Injured Occupants 
 
Figure 6.5 : Injury Severity 
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Figure 6.6 : Fires Causing Injuries 
 
Figure 6.7 : Fire Types 
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6.2 Risk of Injury 
While the above statistics cannot be used to directly confirm the accuracy of all 
aspects of the model, they can be used to give an indication of the relative level of risk 
of injury during a fire.  
Considering first the workplace situations, fewer than 2% of the fires resulted in 
injuries. These injuries were either moderate or slight  none were fatal or life 
threatening. 
Next, consider crowd situations (including retail). There is a similar level of injury 
rate to that for work-places, being approximately 2%. Again, there were no fatalities, 
and only a single life threatening injury (the victim was involved in an irrational 
action). 
The above record indicates a very low risk of injury, unlike that predicted by the 
models for small firecells (which are assumed to be more common than larger ones). 
This would therefore seem to confirm previous comments that in such situations, 
occupants will tend to modify their behaviour as conditions in the firecell change, to 




7.1 Egress Time 
In small firecells particularly, the time required for egress may be dominated by the 
time required for people to pass through the minimum permissible door width. Where 
the maximum travel distance is 24 m, queuing will tend to occur when there are more 
than 15-20 people in the firecell, so when the permitted 50 are present, queuing, rather 
than travel time, governs the time required for egress. Therefore, if the doors provided 
are sufficiently wide so as not to delay the egress of the number of people in the 
firecell, then the number of occupants need have no effect on the egress time, and 
there is no fire safety reason to limit the number of people to 50. 
7.2 Available Time for Egress 
7.2.1 Tenability 
The main aspect of the fire that tends to prevent successful egress is the loss of 
tenability due to descent of the smoke layer. 
The time available for egress is shown to be dependent on the firecell size, with 
smaller firecells having the shortest available time. In most of the fire and occupancy 
scenarios considered, this time tended to be inadequate whatever the means of 
detection and/or suppression was provided. This is typically because detection is often 
predicted after tenability of the firecell is lost. 
7.2.2 Obstruction due to Radiation 
Where a firecell has multiple circulation paths leading to a single exit point, the risk 
that this final exit will be obstructed is very small. It is here that the benefits of 
restricting the length of the common path of travel (the length of path through 
which people must pass) by the UBC 1997 becomes apparent. It is this length which 
most affects the probability of obstruction. In this study, the length is effectively 2 3 
m, but no restrictions other than the total dead end path length are made by other 
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documents reviewed. If this is restricted to a small length, then the critical area in 
which the fire may obstruct the route is also restricted, thus reducing the probability 
that the route may be obstructed. 
The required separation between the fire and the escape route to permit egress is 
dependent to some extent on the fire growth rate and the travel distance. It is generally 
possible to egress as close as 1 m to a fire with a slow growth rate, but when it has a 
fast growth rate, a separation of 2-3 m is required. The 3 m separation is typically 
only required where the travel distance exceeds 50 m  a situation not permitted by 
the Acceptable Solutions. 
The effective risk of obstruction is demonstrated by considering a sofa fire in a 
firecell with maximum travel distance of 48 m (ie a work environment with smoke 
detection). In this case, the risk of obstruction is approximately 1%. Where the fire 
was assumed not to obstruct, and egress was dependent on tenability only, the success 
rate was 83%, and when the risk of obstruction was included, it reduced only to 82%. 
This example was selected as it appeared to show the greatest risk of obstruction, and 
serves to demonstrate the slightness of the risk. 
7.3 Means of Detection and Suppression 
Where the occupants are in the same open space as the fire, and the firecell size is not 
too great (with a maximum travel distance no greater than 30 m) manual detection 
may occur first, followed by smoke detector activation, and finally heat detectors and 
sprinklers. In larger firecells, smoke detection may occur before manual detection. 
The warning provided by heat detection is typically too late to allow many successful 
egress scenarios. Even when sprinklers are provided, manual detection or smoke 
detector activation are required to provide adequate warning. 
While most attention has been directed at detection solutions compliant with the Fire 
Alarm Standard, NZS 4512:1997, it can be shown that the installation of detectors at 
closer spacings can have a significant effect on the detection time, in some cases 




The installation of sprinklers does result in some improvement of success rates, and 
this is mainly due to the effect of controlling the radiation from the fire and its 
potential to obstruct the escape route. While the sprinkler does tend to control the fire 
size, smoke production continues, and loss of tenability of the firecell is generally 
delayed only in the larger firecells. In smaller firecells, the effect is less noticeable. 
7.4 Risks Associated with Scenarios Compliant with the Acceptable 
Solutions C/AS1 
Where the maximum permissible travel distances are short, the tenability time is 
typically short as well, and consequently few successful outcomes are predicted. 
However, a review of the Fire Service Statistics indicates that the risk of injury in a 
fire in a working environment is low, at 1.6%, and hence it is likely that the manual 
detection and pre-movement times predicted in this study are too great. 
In larger firecells, the success rate improves, primarily due to the greater tenability 
time, even when only manual detection by the occupants is available. Although the 
fire size when evacuation is completed from such fire cells may be larger, with 
radiation obstructing a greater area, the greater area of the firecell means that the risk 
of the fire being within such a critical area is low, and there is little reduction in the 
success rate due to that risk. 
The provision of sprinklers reduces the risk of radiation from a fire preventing egress, 
but only improves the tenability time of larger firecells. While there are clearly 
benefits in the reduced risk of obstruction of the escape route by the fire, the benefits 
attributed to the provision of a sprinkler system (permitting increased travel distances) 
are not reflected in the results of this study. 
The 50 person limit noted earlier in section 7.1 appears to be unnecessary, provided 
the door width is adequate to ensure unimpeded egress. 
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7.5 Cautions and Limitations of these Findings 
This report has focused primarily on open plan firecells, with no subdivision of the 
ceiling area by partitions. Where space is partitioned in this way, smoke spread to 
other areas is restricted, resulting in delays to manual detection as well as delay to the 
loss of tenability of other spaces. However, loss of tenability in the space of fire start 
will occur much sooner due to the compartment size, and the reduced smoke storage 
area. If this space were part of the single escape route from the firecell, then this 
situation would pose a significant hazard to occupants forced to evacuate via the 
space. In such situations, automatic detection is the most effective and certain means 
of detection. While this situation is not directly addressed in the Acceptable Solutions 
to the New Zealand Building Code, the Approved Documents for England and Wales 
require smoke detection to be provided in this intervening room. 
While the provision of a sprinkler system has been shown to have little effect on life 
safety, this should not detract from the increased property protection provided by such 
early control and possible suppression of a fire. 
Finally, the review of the number of occupants permitted to be served by a single 
escape route has been undertaken purely on a fire safety basis, assuming an accidental 
fire. It is possible that there are other reasons for maintaining the limit of 50 people 
that relate to acceptable risk in case of malicious attack on the single exit. It may be 
considered acceptable for 50 people, but not 51 people, to be trapped by an arsonist 
or similar non-accidental scenario. It is noted, however, that it would not be 
impossible for an arsonist with an accomplice to have a similar effect on two escape 
routes. 
7.6 Further Work 
7.6.1 Review of the Acceptable Solutions C/AS1 
This study, and the associated spreadsheets developed in the process, could be used to 
assist in a review of the travel distances and detector benefits in the Acceptable 
 221 
 
Solutions, to result in more appropriate and equivalent risk levels for open plan, open 
path travel. 
7.6.2 Assessment of Other Detection Methods 
It may also be appropriate, with the development of detectors activated by different 
fire cues, eg carbon monoxide detectors, to expand the spreadsheet to assess the 
response of these under standard and item fires. The probability of successful 
evacuation for the different scenarios, and possible comparison with other automatic 
detection methods already considered could also be used. Such a study could be 
carried out in conjunction with a review of the Acceptable Solutions if these detectors 
were considered appropriate to include in that document. 
7.6.3 Manual Detection and Pre-Movement Times in Small Firecells 
As noted earlier, those assumed in this model appear to be unreasonably long for 
small firecells where the occupants are in closer proximity to the fire. Modification 
and development of alternative methods to determine these times would allow a more 
realistic risk assessment to be completed for smaller firecells, and assist in the 
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10 : VERIFICATION OF SPREADSHEET WITH 
FPETOOL 
To verify that the use of the equations detailed in Section 3 is correct, the output of 
the spreadsheet for a single scenario has been compared with the results of FPETool. 
This program has been chosen as the comparison due to its wide acceptance within 
the industry. 
The scenario chosen for comparison is a t² fire with a medium growth rate, in a 20 m 
by 20 m room, with a 3 m high ceiling. 
The following detector properties are used: 
•  Heat detector: distance from fire = 1.4 m, Activation temperature 57 ºC, and RTI 
of 20 m½s-½ 
•  Smoke detector: distance from fire = 4.2 m, Activation temperature 33 ºC, and 
RTI of 0.01 m½s-½ 
•  Sprinkler: distance from fire = 2.1 m, Activation temperature 67 ºC, and RTI of 
80 m½s-½ 
The FPETool output for this scenario is attached, and the results of this and the 
spreadsheet are compared in Table.10.1 : Comparison of Spreadsheet with FPETool. 
The differences are primarily due to the difference in calculation time steps. FPETool 
uses a 1 second step, while the spreadsheet, due to the time steps at which the data is 
available tends to use a 20-30 second step. When the 1 second time step is used, the 
spreadsheet results match the FPETool results fairly closely. The accuracy of the 20 














Heat Detector Activation 112 s 125 s 124 s 
Smoke Detector Activation 87 s 98 s 92 s 
Sprinkler Activation 212 s 220 s 220 s 
Tenability Time (for smoke 
layer to drop to 2.0 m above 
floor level) 
290 s 275 s 250 s 
















11 : GRAPHICAL RESULTS FROM T² FIRE ANALYSES 
The following pages give the graphical results for all the t² fire analyses undertaken. 
These are presented, grouped by fire growth rate. 
Slow Fire Growth Rate 
 




Figure 11.2 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment - Slow Fire 
Growth Rate 
 





Figure 11.4 : Work Environment Escape Manual Detection Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Slow Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.5 : Work Environment Escape Heat Detection Scenario Outcome 




Figure 11.6 : Work Environment Escape Smoke Detection Scenario Outcome 
Comparison - Slow Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.7 : Work Environment Available Escape Time with Sprinkler 




Figure 11.8 : Work Environment Escape Sprinkler Protection Scenario Outcome 
Comparison - Slow Fire Growth Rate 
 




Figure 11.10 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Comparison - Slow 
Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.11 : Mobile Crowd Environment Manual Detection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.12 : Mobile Crowd Environment Heat Detection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Slow Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.13 : Mobile Crowd Environment Smoke Detection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.14 : Seated Crowd Environment Available Escape Time - Slow Fire 
Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.15 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 11.16 : Seated Crowd Environment Manual Detection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Slow Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.17 : Seated Crowd Environment Heat Detection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.18 : Seated Crowd Environment Smoke Detection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Slow Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.19 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Slow Fire Growth Rate 
 251 
 
Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.20 : Available Evacuation Time - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 





Figure 11.22 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison - 
Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.23 : Work Environment Manual Detection Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 11.24 : Work Environment Heat Detection Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.25 : Work Environment Smoke Detection Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 11.26 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.27 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.28 : Available Escape Time from Mobile Crowd Occupancy - Medium 
Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.29 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 11.30 : Mobile Crowd Environment Manual Detection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.31 : Mobile Crowd Environment Heat Detection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.32 : Mobile Crowd Environment Smoke Detection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.33 : Available Escape Time from Mobile Crowd Environment with 




Figure 11.34 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison -Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.35 : Available Escape Time from Seated Crowd Environment - 




Figure 11.36 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.37 : Seated Crowd Environment Manual Detection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.38 : Seated  Crowd Environment Heat Detection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.39 : Seated Crowd Environment Smoke Detection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.40 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Seated Crowd 
Environment - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.41 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Medium Fire Growth Rate 
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Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.42 : Available Escape Time - Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 





Figure 11.44 : Work Environment Manual Detection Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison - Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.45 : Work Environment Heat Detection Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 11.46 : Work Environment Smoke Detection Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison - Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.47 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.48 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Comparison - Fast 
Fire Growth Rate 
A figure for the Mobile Crowd Environment Manual Detection Escape Scenario 





Figure 11.49 : Mobile Crowd Environment Heat Detection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison- Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.50 : Mobile Crowd Environment Smoke Detection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.51 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.52 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 11.53 : Seated Crowd Environment Heat Detection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.54 : Seated Crowd Environment Smoke Detection Escape Scenario 




Figure 11.55 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Fast Fire Growth Rate 
Ultra-Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 




Figure 11.57 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison - 
Ultra-Fast Fire Growth Rate 
A figure for the Work Environment Escape Manual Detection Scenario Outcome 





Figure 11.58 : Work Environment Heat Detection Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison - Ultra-Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.59 : Work Environment Smoke Detection Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 11.60 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Ultra-Fast Fire Growth Rate 
 
Figure 11.61 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison - Ultra-Fast Fire Growth Rate 
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12 : GRAPHICAL RESULTS FROM ITEM FIRE 
ANALYSES 
Office Furniture Fires 
 





Figure 12.2 : Available Escape Time from 3 Panel Workstation Fire in Work 
Environment 
 
Figure 12.3 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – Y0/21 




Figure 12.4 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – Y0/22 
Office Furniture Fire 
 
Figure 12.5 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – 2 




Figure 12.6 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – 3 
Panel Workstation Fire 
 
Figure 12.7 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 




Figure 12.8 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y0/22 Office Furniture Fire 
 
Figure 12.9 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 




Figure 12.10 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – 3 Panel Workstation Fire 
 
Figure 12.11 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.12 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Y0/22 Office Furniture Fire 
 
Figure 12.13 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.14 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – 3 Panel Workstation Fire 
 
Figure 12.15 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.16 : Mobile Crowd Environment  Sprinkler Protection Escape 
Scenario Outcome Comparison - Y0/22 Office Furniture Fire 
 
Figure 12.17 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.18 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Comparison - Y0/22 Office Fire 
Soft Furnishing Fires 
 
Figure 12.19 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment – Y5.0/14 




Figure 12.20 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment – Y5.3/10 Chair 
Fire 
 





Figure 12.22 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment – Loveseat Fire 
 




Figure 12.24 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Y5.0/14 Stackable Chair Fire 
 
Figure 12.25 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – 




Figure 12.26 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Y5.4/21 Sofa Fire 
 





Figure 12.28 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – Sofa 
Fire 
 
Figure 12.29 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 




Figure 12.30 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y5.3/10 Chair Fire 
 
Figure 12.31 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 




Figure 12.32 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Loveseat Fire 
 
Figure 12.33 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 




Figure 12.34 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Y5.0/14 Stackable Chair Fire 
 
Figure 12.35 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.36 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Y5.4/21 Sofa Fire 
 
Figure 12.37 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.38 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Sofa Fire 
 
Figure 12.39 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.40 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Y5.3/10 Chair Fire 
 
Figure 12.41 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.42 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Loveseat Fire 
 
Figure 12.43 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.44 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Y5.0/14 Stackable Chair Fire 
 
Figure 12.45 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.46 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Y5.4/21 Sofa Fire 
 
Figure 12.47 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.48 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Sofa Fire 
 
Figure 12.49 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.50 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Y5.3/10 Chair Fire 
 
Figure 12.51 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.52 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Loveseat Fire 
 
Figure 12.53 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.54 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison -  Y5.0/14 Stackable Chair Fire 
 
Figure 12.55 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.56 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Y5.4/21 Sofa Fire 
 
Figure 12.57 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.58 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Sofa Fire 
Storage Fires 
 





Figure 12.60 : Available Escape Time from Work Environment – Y3.3/13 
Bookcase Fire 
 





Figure 12.62 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Y3.1/13 Wardrobe Fire  




Figure 12.63 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison – 
Y3.3/13 Bookcase Fire 
 
Figure 12.64 : Work Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison  - 




Figure 12.65 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Y3.1/13 Wardrobe Fire 
 
Figure 12.66 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 




Figure 12.67 : Available Escape Time from Sprinkler Protected Work 
Environment – Small Dresser Fire 
 
Figure 12.68 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.69 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Y3.3/13 Bookcase Fire 
 
Figure 12.70 : Work Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Small Dresser Fire 
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No figure for Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison  
Y3.1/13 Wardrobe Fire has been included as there are no successful outcomes. 
 
Figure 12.71 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.72 : Mobile Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Small Dresser Fire 
 
Figure 12.73 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.74 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Y3.3/13 Bookcase Fire 
 
Figure 12.75 : Mobile Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Small Dresser Fire 
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A figure for Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome Comparison  
Y3.1/13 Wardrobe Fire has not been included as there are no successful outcomes. 
 
Figure 12.76 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 




Figure 12.77 : Seated Crowd Environment Escape Scenario Outcome 
Comparison – Small Dresser Fire 
 
Figure 12.78 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 




Figure 12.79 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Y3.3/13 Bookcase Fire 
 
Figure 12.80 : Seated Crowd Environment Sprinkler Protection Escape Scenario 
Outcome Comparison – Small Dresser Fire 
